W. H. EDWARDS

THIS PACT BUSINESS

What you ought to know, fear
and prevent

LONDON
VICTOR GOLLANCZ LTD
14 Henrietta Street Covent Garden
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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

THIS book has been written directly in English by the author, who is of German nationality. The Publishers (who invited a political publicist of a Continental country to state his views on the pact controversy) have thought it well to leave what seems to them so vigorous a piece of work untouched; and they ask the reader to excuse a phrase or sentence here and there which may betray the fact that the author has not written in his own language.

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

THIS little book goes to press on October 19th. It is probable that before its appearance certain official documents bearing on some aspects of the questions discussed—in particular the Anglo-French Naval compromise—will have been published. I believe that after seeing these documents, the reader will find that they bear out my contentions.

London, October 19th, 1928. W. H. EDWARDS.

PROLOGUE

At Haldane's and Bismarck's beloved university, Goettingen, we were in the pre-war days of " peace in arms " a band of six friends. We six " inseparables "—two Britishers, four Germans—saw the storm-clouds gathering over Europe, over the countries we loved so well, and over that common heritage of culture and civilisation which we were preparing ourselves to increase to the best of our abilities.

Four of us are sleeping on or near battlefields; one is mutilated; and I, as the one whole survivor, feel that I can only justify my survival by trying to interpret the will of our common dead.

This will, not born on the battlefield, but nascent in us during those years before the war so full of tension, found expression in the idea that it could not be beyond human will and intelligence to avert the impending clash. When the war came this hope was shattered, but replaced by the unconquerable determination that this war should end war.

The tenth anniversary of the armistice, the day consecrated to the memory of the dead, sees a world in arms breaking down under the financial burden of armaments, sees a world seething with distrust, plots, intrigues, and politico-military " understandings." Surely it is a day to face the problem : *What does this pact business mean?* Surely it is the

day to be devoted to plain-speaking about the tangible and intangible threats to the life-work of the dead : to peace everlasting. We dishonour their last will if we shirk this enquiry. Plain speaking about the European situation at any time between 1906 and 1914 might have averted the sacrifice we are commemorating to-day. Plain speaking, to-day of all days, may yet avoid a repetition of the sacrifice and of the institution of a second annual day of mourning for the flower of Europe's manhood.

CHAPTER I

IS THE PEACE PACT A REALITY?

On August 27, fifteen nations, amongst them the most important Powers involved in the world war, signed at Paris a Peace Pact called, in colloquial language, " The Kellogg Pact," although Monsieur Briand, French Foreign Secretary, was author and proposer of the fundamental idea embodied in this treaty. Twenty nations, amongst them Soviet Russia, adhered to the pact after its formal signature. Within the next weeks approximately threescore nations will have pledged themselves in the most solemn phrases (see Appendix A) not to resort to war.

If words mean anything, the signature of this pact should have a most momentous and immediate reaction on the relations of the signatory Powers and on the problem whether good faith or force shall be the dominating influence in determining and regulating these relations. The reaction of public opinion has been disappointing and disquieting; although the Parliaments of the nations who signed the pact are going to meet in the beginning of the autumn, no cabinet, no majority party or majority of parties in any country proposes to draw the logical inference from the solemn national pledge. No French, English, American, or Italian statesman is telling his people

that in consequence of signing the pact he feels justified in reducing armaments or in making proposals to other nations to reduce, concurrently with his own country, armaments of a similar type. Although the covenant of the League of Nations has been supplemented by another document that purports to be a further guarantee of peace whilst it explicitly legalises a war of self-defence—which the covenant does not do—Europe and America feel less secure to-day than when their statesmen signed the covenant of the League at Paris nine years ago. The world war was then described as the " last war," as the " war to end war," as the ultimate and victorious struggle to " make the world safe for democracy," and as the " crusade against force in international relations." These definitions of the world war can be multiplied endlessly from election speeches of English, French, and American statesmen, in which they were seeking constitutional authority to achieve " a final settlement of all European problems " at the Paris Peace Conference.

The most important signatories of the Kellogg Pact—Kellogg, Briand, Stresemann, and Sir Austen Chamberlain's stately locum tenens, Lord Cushendun—were much less optimistic. Although the world has been spared the horror of another war since 1918, they were unanimous in warning the nations not to expect too much of the Kellogg Pact; this pact might prove a barrier to hasty, ill-considered war ; it might give peace propaganda in the whole world an impetus ; but the pact would not, and what they probably meant at the back of their minds was that the pact could not, when all circumstances of

the international situation were taken into account, abolish war.

On the eve of the signature of the Paris pact, Mr. Kellogg wrote a most interesting article in the *Sunday Times*, an article phrased in that meticulous, well-balanced language of the highly trained corporation lawyer and international jurist who is careful to make clear that a pledge he is proposing to others to sign and willing himself to give should neither in word nor in spirit contain more than is justified by the state of mind, the moral attitude, and the strength of will of those who promise to keep that pledge. The salient passage in Mr. Kellogg's article reads as follows :

> " I must not claim that treaties of arbitration and conciliation, or even treaties explicitly renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, afford a certain guarantee against those conflicts between nations which have periodically broken out since the dawn of world history. In addition to treaties, there must be a public conscience aroused against the utter horror and frightfulness of war. The people of the world must acquire a peaceful mind, as it has been said ; and treaties such as I have mentioned can only be regarded as a portion of the problem."
>
> " I am not so blind as to believe that the Millennium has arrived, but I do believe that the world is making great strides toward the pacific adjustment of international disputes and that the common people are of one mind in their desire to see the abolition of war as an institution."

Special notice should be taken of the clever distinction drawn by Mr. Kellogg between the doubts assailing statesmen and diplomats and the strong desire of the man in the street—the man who in future war will be gassed in his house from the air, or sent to a no less foul death in the trenches—that the pact that bears his name should become a reality.

A week before the signing of the Kellogg Pact, Monsieur Briand received, at his farm in Normandy, the London correspondent of the *Sunday Dispatch*, who described the delightful, peaceful surroundings of Monsieur Briand's country house. The French Foreign Secretary carried on his conversation with the English journalist whilst he was angling in a brook on his estate. This atmosphere of peace and serenity does not dull the cautious mind of the French statesman. Briand stated : " The traditional right to wage war—even aggressive war—of their own free will for selfish objectives will be abandoned by the nations signing the new treaty. Let us suppose that the peoples accept the new agreement in all seriousness, and that, after putting its signature to a declaration that war is not to be used as an instrument of national policy, a nation should launch a war upon a neighbour, what would be the result ? It would have been unfaithful to its pledge. It would have affronted the public opinion of the world. It would face a terrific moral condemnation. The reprobation would be so universal that the offending country would become a pariah among the nations. The stigma would make its national life impossible. I do not believe that wars would break out under

these conditions. They might become quite impossible—at the very least a Government committed to such a treaty certainly would think twice before plunging into war."

The correspondent asks Briand the question whether it would be easy to define the aggressor in a future war. Briand answers : " It is true that combatant nations usually contend that they are fighting in self-defence or on behalf of their honour." In the further course of the interview, Briand contends that the upholding of peace is a matter of good faith. " Henceforth," he says, " nations will not be able to launch warlike adventures without reflection and appeal to judges." His final dictum is perhaps of the greatest importance, and should be carefully pondered over by all those who desire to make the Peace Pact a reality : " War," said Briand, " is still a possibility, but it does not dominate the situation and the destiny of people so completely as it once did. The pact against war is a new obstacle to the frightful calamity which is war."

Lord Cushendun, discussing the treaty with English journalists in Paris an hour after its signature, made a statement that " the pact would suffer only if it were burdened with extravagant interpretations. Nobody imagined that by the signing of this treaty war would be finally abolished, and, if this were borne in mind, people would not be subject to terrible disappointment on the first occasion on which some little minor war broke out."

Even Dr. Stresemann, the representative of the only big Power that can be described as practically disarmed—being therefore perhaps the most interested

party in assuming the reality of the pact—uses words of the greatest caution. In a *communique* issued to the International Press on his arrival in Paris, Dr. Stresemann states : " With the conclusion of the pact the peace of the world has not been definitely consolidated." Dr. Stresemann is only convinced that " a new basis which will, with the goodwill of all nations, permit the realisation of a world in which war—one of the most horrible scourges of humanity —will no longer exist " has been laid.

Italy frankly showed its scepticism by refusing to send a special representative to affix its signature, while the Italian Press ridiculed the pact and described it, in terms akin to that unhappy phrase of Germany's War Chancellor, as another " scrap of paper." The attitude of the statesmen signing the pact was carefully reflected in the Press of the world. *The Times* frankly admits that the pact is worthless if it is not backed up by the biggest Power neutral to European and Asiatic conflicts : the United States. Should the United States decline to accept responsibility for the execution of the pact, then it has little more significance than such as may be implied by the resolutions of a Peace Congress. The *Daily Telegraph* emphasises that the real test of this pact is : " whether by this renunciation of war the Governments and peoples can be brought to give to peace some part of the ingenuity and fierce energy hitherto given to thoughts of war." The *Morning Post* clearly defines the cause of the doubts uppermost in the minds of the statesmen by describing the pact as " a more advanced base from which to conduct what may be called the peace offensive," but adds this

important proviso : " The jealousies and rivalries and antagonisms which at present embarrass the international relations will not be one whit abated and the passions which they excite will not be exorcised, but at least they will manifest themselves in a more discouraging atmosphere. They will not so easily reach the flash-point." The *Daily Mail* describes the pact as " a new obstacle to the frightful calamity which is war," but reminds its readers that " the Kellogg Pact does not abolish war, nor can it lead to immediate disarmament." Its evening edition, the *Evening News*, joins in the hope of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, that the pact will be " more than a mere scrap of paper," and that it may prove " a barrier to that next war." This paper goes on to say : " This pact cannot abolish war—no treaty can do that—but at least its existence will cause the statesmen to think more than twice about committing millions of people to slaughter." (Why think about it at all?) The *Daily News* would not be at all surprised if some of the statesmen who signed the pact entertained secret doubts about the reality of events which had, in fact, caught not a few of them unawares. " Never before in history have the leading nations of the world had the temerity formally to sign away the right to make war. It must seem to the trained diplomatic mind a monstrous indiscretion." The *Daily Chronicle* urges that " much will depend also on the faith which statesmen themselves appear to repose in the promise they have collectively made ; that faith can only be demonstrated in one way, by their willingness to proclaim it in act as well as in word—viz., by reducing armaments, and so destroying

the demons of fear and suspicion." The *Daily Express* is slightly sarcastic in stating that " a pact that suggests to the nations that peace and not war should be their preoccupation cannot be wholly futile. To some minds it might look like a company of partially reformed and excessively headachy drunkards signing the pledge in a sudden moment of exaltation ; but even a formal recitation of the collects of peace, a mechanical counting of the beads of amity, is better than nothing." The *Daily Herald* describes the pact as a " peace treaty by permission of the war-mongers," and reminds its readers that the world continues an armed camp ; instead of disarmament, there are attempts to save expenditure by mutual agreement as to the type of armaments considered requisite in peace time. " Europe is still in process of recovering from the effects of a war to end war, and, unless the peoples themselves take the necessary action towards outlawing war, this pact to end war will have as disillusioning an outcome, for, despite the treaty and the declarations accompanying it, war and force remain. They are psychologically the mainsprings of international action." Finally, the *Manchester Guardian* points out that " the pact may be little or much at any moment—little if Parliaments want little ; much so soon as they want much."

The French Press treated the pact as a moral gesture, of which the value would be seen " hereafter." The *Figaro* expressed French sentiment admirably in describing the pact as " a step towards Tipperary, but on a long way to the Tipperary of universal world peace."

As Italy was not represented at Paris by a first-rank politician or diplomat, we must form an estimate of Italy's sentiments towards the pact by recognised semi-official expressions of opinion. Addressing a company of officers, Arnaldo Mussolini, the brother of the Duce, contended " that a pact signed with so much solemnity was no laughing matter, but, if they wanted to be sincere, it was impossible to avoid seeing in the Kellogg Pact a certain amount of mutual ' leg-pulling,' evincing insincerity all the more flagrant, seeing that it was signed in the capital of a people which for centuries had been continuously at war. The pact represented a platonic gesture devoid of all likely influence on the history of the nations."

This point of view is put in cruder form and more cynical language by the semi-official organs of the Italian Government. *Tevere* describes the pact as the " Great Hypocrisy," and expresses particular surprise " that England, the special home of humour and the land of *Pickwick*, should lend its support to this pacifist pantomime." *Tribuna* is hyper-cynical : " The signature of this pact will not for long illumine the pages of history, but responsibility for the waning of this, the latest of so many much-vaunted dawns of international peace, will not lie at Italy's door, but rather at that of other States, amongst them the major signatories, who prepared by their ceremony in Paris a welter of trouble and bitter suspicion under a cloak of fine words of peace."

The Roman Correspondent of *The Times* gives in his message of August 24 an admirable condensed review of Italian political opinion—public opinion

being non-existent in that country—on the reality of the pact :

"According to the *Impero*, the pact is both juridically and politically defective, and adds nothing to the guarantees for peace already afforded by the League of Nations. The *Popolo d'Italia*, postulating that in international relations there exists no law, admits that the stronger nations have every right by means of a so-called 'pact to end war' to order lesser Powers to keep the peace. Italy, by signing the pact, merely recognises 'a reality for the time being immutable.'

"The *Lavoro d'Italia*, in an equally cynical consideration of Mr. Kellogg's initiative, defends Italian acceptance on grounds of courtesy and opportuneness, explaining that 'it is, therefore, necessary, as humanity and courtesy have their own poetic rights, to adhere to peace pacts, even if they originate in countries which find it such a difficult matter to leave the world in peace. Thus,' adds the *Lavoro*, 'it is necessary also to foster in peace one's own national conception of peace. Woe to those who disturb it.'"

The Pittsburg *Post-Gazette* voices the serious doubts of the American man-in-the-street in describing the probable effects of the pact on peace and disarmament in the following terms :

"Now that the American President has said that the anti-war pact need not affect the American Army and Navy, the French will be in a much better position to continue to do what they

like about their armies. President Coolidge says the American Army and Navy are intended only for defence. That is what they all say, and how much more so since in signing the Kellogg Treaty France and her Allies promise never to attack anyone ?

" So with England agreeing as a corollary to the naval agreement not to oppose the French trained reserve programme, and with America indicating that she will make no disarmament drive following the signing of the Kellogg Pact, the French and their partners face the prospects of having opposed to them at the coming Geneva discussions only Germany and Russia. That makes it look easy for them.

" Of course something may be done in the direction of naval disarmament, but that does not greatly concern the French, since England, the chief opponent of submarines, will now make no further opposition to the French building smaller defensive undersea boats, on which they wish to concentrate."

The man-in-the-street—who in every war has been the man in the trenches, and who, at the end of wars which were not of his own making had the privilege to pay for them, either by the burden of strangling taxation or by prolonged unemployment, reducing him and his family to the verge of penury, or even driving him into the arms of the poor law and its merciless institutions—is surely entitled to ask the question why the " Great Ones of the Earth,"

the men whom he has placed in power to look after his predominant interest, peace, sign peace pacts, although their minds are overgrown by doubts and fears of what may occur to-morrow? The man-in-the-street, the victim of the world war—whether he be the over-taxed Britisher or the despoiled-by-inflation of France, Italy, Germany, and Austria—is morally entitled to ask the question: "Why are peace guarantees so weak?" Why are pacific-minded, honest statesmen like Briand, Kellogg, and Stresemann so doubtful about the result of this pact, which was concluded with the intention of outlawing war. The question that quite naturally poses itself is: whether war can be outlawed—a question that can only be answered in the positive when statesmen who are viewing the world's situation can agree on the fundamental proposition that the most important world problems are settled or on the way to a lasting settlement. The question must be negatived if honest and unprejudiced students of international politics have to admit, in the admirable wording of the *Morning Post*, that "the jealousies, rivalries, and antagonisms which at present embarrass international relations will not be one whit abated and the passions which they excite will not be exorcised." If these antagonisms will *not* be abated, if these passions are not *yet* exorcised, the potential victim of that "next war" is entitled to ask a further question: "Where do these rivalries, antagonisms, and passions arise, and what are the wielders of power who admit their existence and recognise their dangerous character doing to abate and exorcise them?"

Before the world war became first a possibility, then an evermore threatening probability, by the increasingly embittered Anglo-German naval problem and industrial competition, the roots of this conflict were bursting through the soil of European policy and diplomacy. They were—although the German and English peoples bore one another no engrained hatred, although pastors, journalists and business men were hobnobbing together and emphasising the absolute "unthinkableness" of an Anglo-German war—the pivot of world politics. Every hyper-nationalist French, Russian, Austrian, and Italian statesman regarded this so-called inevitableness of an Anglo-German conflict as the one configuration on the international chessboard on which he was able to rely in all his calculations.

If the statesmen who are to-day in power, some of them omnipotent and unchallenged in their own countries, can, ten years after the armistice and eight years after the foundation of the League of Nations, express in more or less explicit language the idea that the Kellogg Pact may retard, but cannot banish, the next war, it is the appropriate time for every lover of peace in every country to be on the lookout for that seed of conflict, for that juxtaposition of inimical powers that can, if left alone and allowed to mature, furnish the war-mongers all over the world with the ways and means of staging a repetition of the tragedy of 1914.

CHAPTER II

AFTER TWENTY YEARS

Twenty years ago the armed camps of Europe, the Entente and the Triple Alliance, were on the verge of war because Austria had annexed Bosnia without giving suitable compensation to Serbia and Russia. The international situation, as it was disclosed to the initiated in the autumn of 1908 and the winter of 1908–9, could leave no reasonable doubt in the minds of unbiassed experts that war, originating in the unsolved and unabated tension between Austria, Italy, Russia, and Serbia, had only been staved off for the moment because Austria's ally, Germany, was ultra-ready and Russia had not yet recovered, either financially or in a military sense, from the after-effects of revolutionary unrest and the Russo-Japanese War. Lord Hardinge, diplomat of uncommonly acute foresight, summed up the situation in these words: "There can be little doubt that the Serbians will deeply resent the humiliation which they have suffered at the hands of Austria; while the Russians will never be able to forget the fact that Austria and Germany availed themselves at the moment of Russia's weakness to harass her in a humiliating and hectoring manner."

Here, in a very few words, the situation is outlined out of which the world war arose. St. Petersburg,

Belgrade, and Vienna should not have let the bitterness of their feelings and the intensity of their nationalist aspirations carry them away to precipitate action in 1914 if the three great Powers, England, France, and Germany, working in closest co-operation, had exercised a steadying influence, or had in closest unison enforced a peace policy, being the good friends they ought to have been for the sake of the peace of the world and the safety of our civilisation. The feelings dominating the official Anglo-German relations in 1908 find expression in the confidential minute of the Kaiser to Count Buelow, who had forwarded to his monarch a recommendation of the German Ambassador in London (Count Metternich) to come to an arrangement with England on the number of ships to be built annually in the English and German Navies. The Kaiser fulminates as follows :

" It must be indicated to him that good relationship to England is not wanted by me at the price of the building of Germany's fleet. If England intends to offer us her hand in condescension with a hint that we must reduce our fleet, that is a bottomless impertinence which involves a grave insult to the German nation and its Kaiser which must be repelled by the Ambassador *a limine*. With the same right, France and Russia could then demand a limitation of our land armaments. As soon as one allows a foreign State, under whatever pretext, to interfere with one's armaments, one abdicates, like Portugal and Spain. The German fleet is not built against anyone, and,

therefore, not against England, but according to our own necessity. That is said quite clearly in the Naval Law, and has remained unchallenged for eleven years. This law will be carried out to the last tittle ; whether the Britons like it or not does not matter. If they want war, let them begin it ; we are not afraid."

How the unsolved Anglo-German naval and industrial rivalry affected French mentality has been concisely summed up in Lee's biography of King Edward, in a conversation between the English monarch and Clemenceau in Marienbad at the end of August 1908. Clemenceau, who had been informed that attempts to limit German naval expansion had failed (compare the final word of the Kaiser on this subject), appeared to think a conflict probable—a conflict that, in the opinion of the French statesman, would be brought about, not by Germany, but " by some imprudence on the part of English public men or by some untimely movement of English public opinion. . . . Though there is much talk of invasion by Germany, no one seriously believes it possible, and confidence in the power of the British fleet to destroy the German fleet in case of need has not been seriously impaired. But for France the danger of invasion is very real. We know that on the morrow of the outbreak of war between Germany and England, the German armies will invade France by way of Belgium, and that Germany will seek in France an indemnity for the losses likely to be suffered on sea at the hands of England. What can England do to help us ? Destroy the German fleet ?

L'Angleterre ferait ainsi un beau trou dans l'eau ! In 1870 there was no German fleet, but the Prussians entered Paris all the same."

Continuing his exposition of the international situation, Clemenceau praised the efforts of Haldane to create in England the groundwork of a future national army—expeditionary force and territorial army—but emphasised that, even if in England after the declaration of war a sufficient number of men were forthcoming, no adequate preparations for the manufacture of weapons and ammunition for a large army had been made. Clemenceau, as prophet of the shell crisis of 1915, emphatically declared :

" These things cannot be improvised. I know you Englishmen do not want to be entangled in a continental war, but I ask you, as I have asked C. B., Haldane, and Grey, whether your policy is to-day what it was a century ago—to prevent the domination of Europe by any one Power ? If it is, then you ought to look things in the face.

" If war comes, and we are smashed for want of timely and efficient help from you, you will afterwards be obliged to incur obligations vastly greater than any now requisite—or you will have to bow your necks to the victor. I have preached this in season and out of season, and recently in the *Temps* during the visit of President Fallières to London. But it is difficult to get Englishmen to look at things from our point of view, or to understand the exigencies of our situation. Some of your public men are appallingly ignorant. The fact is that England cannot maintain her position

in Europe and in the world, nor can her friendship with France be secure against surprises unless she has an adequate army."

Clemenceau finished off his remarks by the witty epigram that, although Trafalgar had been a brilliant naval victory, England had broken Napoleon at Waterloo—a comparatively small military engagement. A few weeks before this conversation, Lord Grey had summed up the evil effects of the Anglo-German naval rivalry on all politicians and forces anxious to embroil European Powers in a war in these terms :

" The real difficulty is not in the present relations of the two countries, but in a certain anxiety as to their probable relations with each other a few years hence. A section of opinion in each country speaks and writes as if Germany and England were bound to entertain, increasingly as years go on, unfriendly designs upon each other. In neither country does this opinion appear to be encouraged; on the contrary, it is deprecated by the authorities ; but it persists, and has come now to found itself upon the rivalry in naval expenditure, the growth of which is now taken by public opinion as the test of what the prospective relations of the two countries are likely to be. Should naval expenditure increase, apprehension will be intensified ; if the expenditure were slackened, apprehension would at once diminish.

" The British Government would not think of questioning the right of Germany to build as large

a navy as she thinks necessary for her own purposes nor would they complain of it. But they have to face the fact that at the present rate of construction the German naval programme will, in a very few years, place the German Navy in a position of superiority to the British as regards the most powerful type of battleship.

" This will necessitate a new British programme of construction to be begun next year. It will be demanded by public opinion ; it must avowedly be accounted for solely by reference to the German programme ; for the other nations of Europe are either not adding appreciably to their navies or have no navies of importance ; and nations outside Europe are too distant or have no armies sufficient to threaten the independence of Great Britain.

" Whereas, if the German Navy became superior or even attained such a relative proportion to the British as to enable it at an untoward moment to secure command of the sea for a few days, Great Britain would be, not only defeated, but occupied and conquered ; Germany does not run so great a risk as this from any superiority of the British fleet, for the British Army is so inferior to the German in size that occupation and conquest are out of the question. Without, therefore, attributing any sinister motive to the building of the German fleet, it is a paramount necessity to increase British naval expenditure to meet the German programme, though we fear that this may be taken as a sign of increasing rivalry and distrust, and

though we regret anything which is likely to be a barrier to better feeling.

" On the other hand, a slackening of naval expenditure on both sides would at once be followed by a great rebound in public opinion towards friendly feeling and security. . . . It would be welcomed, not in Germany and England alone, but everywhere, as evidence of pacific intentions, of good understanding and confidence between the two countries. Rightly or wrongly, a great part of the world has come of late years to concentrate attention upon the relations between England and Germany, to look in them for the chief indication of whether the peace of the world is likely to be disturbed, and to estimate this by their rivalry in naval expenditure. If this rivalry diminished, still more if the two countries came to any agreement about it, there would be increased confidence throughout the world, a general sense of security such as no other event could produce, and the Emperor and King would stand together before the world as the great peacemakers."

The situation in Europe, honeycombed with military and naval " understandings," every parliament devoting a considerable portion of its time to armament debates and to the discussion of new taxes levied for the purpose of financing further armaments, found expression in a conversation between Sir Ernest Cassel and Ballin, in which Cassel expressed the opinion " that some day England might perhaps feel compelled, in agreement with the other two Entente Powers, to direct a formal enquiry to

Germany as to when and at what point she proposed to put a stop to naval building." Ballin passionately replied " that such an attempt to force Germany into a Fashoda-like position in questions of armament would mean immediate war."

We therefore find the statesmen, economists, and certainly the most important generals and admirals who were already preparing a long time for the contingency of war, more or less unanimous in the conviction *that nothing short of a miracle could avoid the clash.* This conviction can be substantiated by facts and figures. The naval budgets of the great Powers showed a substantial increase in the decade from 1901 to 1911. In million pounds sterling the increase was :

Great Britain	13.4
United States	10.4
Japan	4.3
France	2.9
Russia	3.9
Germany	12.5
Italy	3.4
Austria	3.2

The army budgets showed a proportionate increase. From 1905 to 1910 the army budgets showed the following increase, in million pounds sterling :

France	6.1
Germany	8.2
Japan	4.1
Italy	1.0
United States	14.0

Great Britain, as a result of the Haldane army reform, practically no change.

This concentration of military and naval forces, this lavish expenditure of public money on armaments, was deemed necessary, in the camp of the Allies, by the so-called "German menace." The Allies co-operated in politics and armaments with the alleged object of averting German hegemony in Europe. Germany and her Allies were arming because they were under the influence of the encirclement complex, and because they believed they could only retain their fair share of the world trade, of unexploited colonies, and of public contracts in undeveloped countries, if and when they were able to back up their demand for a share by force of arms. The organiser of the German fleet, Admiral von Tirpitz, has discussed these motives of German naval armament with the most complete frankness in his Memoirs. He formulates the thesis of the advocates of a strong German Navy in the following words :

> "Salisbury's saying that big states would become bigger and stronger, small ones smaller and weaker, expresses the modern development towards the concentration of power, towards the trust system. As Germany is far behind with regard to sea power, it is a matter of vital importance for us to make up for lost time. Obviously, in Germany's development as a world industrial and commercial state lies the best means of ensuring that the surplus population remains German. This development is as irresistible as a law of nature. If it were to be dammed up, it would burst through the dam. Points of contact and disagreement

with other nations grow out of an industrial and commercial development of this kind. Sea power is therefore indispensable to Germany lest she rapidly go under. . . ."

When Lord Haldane and Lord Grey, in negotiations with German statesmen in Berlin and with German diplomats in London, made well-meant but psychologically belated efforts to settle " the points of contact and disagreement" between England and Germany, the European atmosphere of conflict, and the adverse commitments into which England and Germany had been enticed in the preceding decade, had converted the two strongest European Powers from political free agents into the prisoners—by honour bound—of their weaker allies. There is an old adage in history that in a combination of Powers it is always the weaker Power which is most anxious to force an issue at the expense, and frequently without full knowledge, of the senior partner, who will have to bear the brunt of the risk. If England and Germany had been able to arrive at an equitable settlement of their conflicting interests, the rest of the world would have been obliged to abandon the idea of settling more or less localisable issues by other than peaceful means. If one were to take to-day a referendum in England and Germany on the deeper cause of the world war, one would probably be able to obtain a four-fifths majority for the proposition *that statesmanship had failed to reconcile important conflicting interests of the two countries before that conflict of interests was made*—by Russian, French, Austrian, and Italian warmongers—*the centre-piece of a war game*

other Powers were anxious to stage at the expense of the two Teutonic peoples.

If there has been a lesson that the war has taught mankind, it is the plain fact that war and armaments never supply the answer to economic problems. When war broke out in 1914, a venturesome spirit, speaking before English business-men, risked the prophecy that by the mere fact of England having declared war on Germany "every Englishman would be better off." Four years of an exhausting war and a complete military and naval victory of the Allies, and the prolonged physical and material ravages of German inflation, have not enriched a single Englishman by a single penny. Germany is, relatively speaking—taking her larger population and her lack of colonies into account—more prosperous than England. The miner in the Ruhr is earning 10*s.* to 11*s.* per shift in comparison with 6*s.* to 8*s.* earned by the English miner—if the latter has full time employment—while the cost of living in industrial districts of Germany and England stands, as proved by the findings of the *Labour Gazette*, at 66 : 100. Germany, with a population of sixty-seven millions, has, on the average, 700,000 unemployed. Great Britain, with forty-seven millions, has to keep 1.3 millions on the dole. Surely these facts—which could be multiplied endlessly by statistics of production in trades in which Germany and England compete on the world's markets—prove that an orgy of force and a ruthless war—not only waged against combatants ; England's blockade and Germany's U-boat war !—have left the economic problems unsolved. Force could disarm the German Navy and Army, but it

could not cope with the German people's faculty for organisation and sustained hard work.

In reviewing the international political situation in 1928, we will try to answer the question whether this lesson, inculcated by the world war, has been learnt by humanity, or whether mankind at large, independent of race and nationality, still adheres to the easy-going maxim of the Bourbons " to learn nothing and to forget nothing " and is blind to the fact that, in other words, *history* is carefully *preparing to repeat itself.*

In 1928 we find that the leading statesmen state even more explicitly in public than did their colleagues of 1908 their well-considered doubts on the subject of the avoidableness of war. In 1908 everybody was professing that their policy—and sometimes their policy alone—was the only suitable policy to keep the peace. In 1928 we find that, even after signing the Kellogg Pact, statesmen whose honest pacific sentiments cannot be challenged do not claim to know a patent remedy for preserving peace. The safeguards each country evolves are remedies similar to those applied twenty years ago. The *Manchester Guardian* can make the uncontradicted statement that the Anglo-French Entente has been reconstructed, and that the basis of this new Anglo-French commitment has been laid in those selfsame " discussions of military and naval experts " which were repeatedly staged between 1904 and 1914. American public opinion is firmly convinced that the new " Entente " is an attempt to circumvent the Washington Naval Agreement, and constitutes a veiled threat to the naval parity between Great Britain and the

United States agreed upon in 1921. Italian public opinion is not less nervous. It believes the new understanding to be an attempt to persuade Great Britain to side with France in a Franco-Italian conflict. The American criticism of the new "Entente" has elicited the English reply that the prime mover in an attempt to abrogate indirectly the Washington Treaty was not Great Britain, but the United States. The New York correspondent of the *Sunday Express* recently made the sensational disclosure—not denied by American political authorities—that an understanding of a much more intimate character than the Franco-British naval compromise had been entered into by the United States and Brazil. This agreement is said to provide that, in the case of the United States being engaged in an armed conflict with a third party, the Brazilian Navy, recently modernised, becomes automatically the kernel of the South American squadron of the United States.

In Europe the policy of military alliances of a defensive and aggressive character was initiated by France. Various treaties concluded between France and the States of the so-called " Little Entente " are appended, and prove conclusively that the political conceptions determining the work of draughtsmanship have not changed since the first decade of the twentieth century. These military alliances were at first primarily directed against Germany, and against the perhaps more serious danger of Germany becoming a political and military appendix of Soviet Russia. When Germany's development continued in the direction of a bourgeois republic, and the

external policy of the new Reich was distinctly pacific, as evidenced by the signature of the Locarno treaties, these new military treaties were directed more implicitly against the imperialistic Italy of Mussolini.

The Duce retaliated by concluding treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece, and by making overtures to Germany—hitherto summarily rejected—to form an anti-French block in the centre of Europe. Italy further tried to create in Albania an Italian colony capable of being used as a military bridge-head for the economic and political penetration of the Balkans. The political situation in Europe, therefore, is to-day not essentially different from the situation of 1908. A flare-up in the Balkans, a provocative move of one Power against the other in that sphere, may—as it did in 1914—provoke, at a moment's notice, a war, in which Italy, as a leading ally of one combination, and France, as a reserve power and strength of another combination, may become involved without their diplomats and statesmen having themselves committed errors of judgment or tried to provoke a conflict. All the smaller schemers and plotters in the capitals of eastern and south-eastern Europe are taking the possibility or the probability of a Franco-Italian conflict as assuredly for granted as certain statesmen, before the world war, relied on the inevitableness of the Anglo-German conflict. The parallel development of the situation in 1908 and in 1928 can even be substantiated by a number of striking figures. The expenditure on armaments (army, navy, and air force) was (in million pounds sterling) as follows :

	1911	1927
Great Britain and India ..	91.4	122.4
France	49.7	54.0
Italy	20.4	44.1
Japan	16.6	29.4
United States	60.6	130.0
Czecho-Slovakia	—	8.0
Yugo-Slavia	—	8.0
Poland	—	2.0
Roumania	—	5.0
	238.7	402.9

These figures prove that ten years after the conclusion of a "war to end war" an impoverished world spent—even if we take the decrease of purchasing power of money into account—more real values on preparation for war than had been apportioned for this purpose in 1908, when the world was spending 239 million pounds. Three military states of first rank are not included in this computation—Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—because these three Powers have disappeared entirely as military menaces to the Powers above enumerated—with the exception of Poland and Roumania. Yet Europe and the United States are spending to-day more on armaments than when the democratic Powers honestly believed that their liberty and existence were threatened by Kaiser and Czar—by two neurasthenic, irresponsible monarchs wielding, as heads of the biggest military establishments of the world, enormous uncontrolled powers of life and death.

We know that the nations who are spending to-day something over four hundred million pounds on

armaments have political leaders who feel that they are responsible for the peaceful development of their countries. If these statesmen feel that they must express the doubts we registered, and that they must back up their doubts by demanding of their people these financial sacrifices for armaments, taxpayers are entitled to ask the question : " Where is the next Kaiser ? " They are entitled to ask that question, because they have not only to bear the same burden of military expenses as before the war, but they have to find the means out of a much smaller national income—Rathenau stated at the Genoa Conference of 1922 that the purchasing power of the world had fallen by 40 per cent. in consequence of the war—and have to bear this heavy burden augmented by the huge interest due on their national debts inflated by war. When Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy were spending 220 million pounds sterling per annum on armaments in 1911, they were disbursing 102 million pounds in interest on their national debts. In 1927, when they were spending 350 million pounds on armaments, they had to pay 798 million pounds in interest and debt redemption. To justify these heavier burdens under more unfavourable circumstances—with the exception of the United States—one feels bound to accept the thesis that there are greater latent dangers in the present situation than in the situation of 1908.

CHAPTER III

THE MEDITERRANEAN KAISER

In the decade before the world war, pacifists and democrats of western Europe often asked the question why an industrious and essentially peaceful nation like Germany placed at the disposal of its nervous, capricious, and unbalanced ruler the most expensive toys for a war game. A straight answer to this question was never given. For obvious political reasons the German people could not tell the world that they would have preferred to place the same money and armaments at the disposal of a level-headed, energetic statesman. Although the majority of the German people did not like their ruler, although the men who praised him were, for the greater part, sycophants, there was no open obstruction and opposition to his much vaunted policy of the " mailed fist " and the " shimmering armour," because the German people had—rightly or wrongly —conceived the impression that the nations surrounding Germany and the two Anglo-Saxon countries oversea were not willing to discuss in a friendly spirit of " give and take " the economic needs and the colonial aspirations of a people of 70 millions.

If you ask the same question to-day of Italians who are not Fascisti or hyper-nationalists, you get a similar answer. They claim that only a man of

Mussolini's type, backed up by armaments, will ensure for Italy the necessary respect and consideration which the democracies of western Europe would not of their free accord grant to the 40 million industrious Italians cooped up in a country that does not produce sufficient foodstuffs for its inhabitants and has neither coal nor iron-ore in sufficient quantities to found a prospering " big industry " that by its exports can pay for the foodstuffs that have to be imported.

After comparing the situation of Germany in 1908 and of Italy in 1928, it is worth while to pay some attention to the personalities of the rulers. Dynamic personalities of middle age, gifted, rapidly able to assimilate new problems and ideas, unbalanced in praise or criticism, enthusiastic for the fads of the fleeting moment, Kaiser and Duce show a complete lack of judgment. Although their countries were in situations demanding the maximum of tact in handling friends and adversaries, the Kaiser and the Duce were equally successful in making the largest possible number of enemies and alienating all potential friends of the nation, political or personal, who were capable of proving their friendship without sacrificing their self-respect. Tirpitz, the creator of the German Fleet, has told us how " Little Willie " blunted the edge of that weapon by continually bragging about its quality and its future use. No contemporary of the world war is likely to forget the Kaiser's speeches on the policy of the " mailed fist," his continual reminder to the world of the " shimmering armour " Germany was wearing, and his hysterical demand for a " place in

the sun " for Germany. Mussolini has, as far as possible, copied the Kaiser. He ridicules peace and negotiations. He dreams of the day when the wings of thousands of Italian aeroplanes " will blacken the sun." He has been described in the pacifist and democratic papers of England and France as " the Mad Dog of Europe," and as the " Mediterranean Kaiser."

We believe that the similarity between Wilhelm of Hohenzollern and Benito Mussolini can also be traced in their erratic foreign policies. The Kaiser was ever unstable in his friendships. Coming to the throne in 1888, he cast aside the Russo-German friendship carefully fostered by Bismarck. In 1890 he concluded the Heligoland Treaty with Great Britain, and followed it up by vain attempts to make British policy his colonial handmaiden. In 1895 he appealed to the world to form an anti-Japanese Alliance. In 1901 he suggested an Anglo-German-French crusade against the Slav peoples. In 1905 he concluded the tentative treaty with the Czar at Björköe. In 1908 he threatened Russia with war because she would not acquiesce quickly enough and without compensation in the annexation of Bosnia by Austria. In 1912 he was envisaging a treaty of neutrality and friendship with Great Britain, and in 1914 he entered on the world war fronting against Russia and England at the same time.

Mussolini, stronger of will and more brawny than the neurotic Kaiser, managed to eclipse Wilhelm's record of twenty-six years in the five years he has been Italy's spokesman in the field of international politics. Italy—under the leadership

of Giolitti, Nitti, and Sforza—had, from the Armistice to the Fascist revolution, adopted a foreign policy of conciliation and of aiding in the reconstruction of the central European Powers. The Genoa Conference of 1922 was the zenith of this policy. After Mussolini's advent to power, he brusquely changed the orientation of Italy's policy. Instead of consummating the treaties Sforza had prepared in delicate negotiations with Yugo-Slavia, the Dictator tried to bluff the Serbian neighbour by the thunder of ultimatums. He believed that he could follow that policy in all security, because he gave up the policy of Anglo-Italian co-operation in the reconstruction of Europe and substituted for it the moral and political support of Poincaré's pet project: the occupation of the Ruhr. The ultimatum had very little effect at Belgrade, and had to be followed by further treaty negotiations, because France backed up Yugo-Slavia and was not over-grateful for the "mission of Italian engineers," sent by Mussolini to assist in the exploitation of the newly occupied German territory. Count Sforza charged Mussolini with being the main culprit of the ill-conceived and ill-timed Ruhr adventure. In Sforza's opinion, Belgium, being adverse to the occupation, would have stood by England and could have thwarted Poincaré's project if Italy had joined England and Belgium. Italy's hasty offer of moral and political assistance tendered to Poincaré turned the scale with the Allies in favour of the invasion. In 1923 the murder of Italians on the frontier between Greece and Albania offered Mussolini an excuse to shell Corfu and to stage a spectacular campaign of

intimidation directed against Greece. As soon as England and France made up their differences over the occupation of the Ruhr and united in protecting little Greece, Mussolini, just as Wilhelm after Tangier, had to back out with less satisfaction and moral success than he could have obtained by a pacific policy of protest. In 1924 the policy of Mussolini was mainly negative. The Italian delegates at the Reparations Conference in London and at the session of the League of Nations did everything possible—at the behest of their lord—to make a settlement of the reparations problem and an agreement on the protocol proposed by Macdonald and Herriot less easy.

When Macdonald was succeeded by Baldwin in the autumn of 1924, Mussolini hastened to offer the services of Italy to the new British Cabinet. He tried to back up England in Turkey, Egypt, Abyssinia, and against Russia, claiming as Italian compensation a free hand on the Balkans and English assistance in the exploitation of the East African interests of Italy. The three documents embodying this policy were the Italian ratification of the annexation of Bessarabia by Roumania, the Anglo-Italian treaty on Abyssinia, and the Pact of Tirana. When this policy did not result in the formation of the Balkan block, designed to encircle Yugo-Slavia, Mussolini sought new friends. He tried to bring about a meeting with Stresemann, and encouraged the latter to expect Italian support if and when Germany should raise the question of the occupation of the Rhineland. When Germany cold-shouldered him, the Duce took a few speeches on the " Anschluss "

as a text for violent diatribes against Germany. France is not treated much better. In September 1926 he assures his western neighbour that Italy is suffocated by its rapid increase of population and must, therefore, " expand or explode." At the same time Mussolini discourages emigration to all foreign countries except France, and expresses the hope that the Italian people in 1950 will have increased to 60 millions. He tries to form a Mediterranean alliance with Spain directed against France. His efforts result in cementing Franco-Spanish friendship. The Italy of 1922, in good relations with France, and friendly relations with England and Germany, frequently assisted financially by the leading bankers of the United States, is, after five years of Mussolini's régime, only the friend of the dictators of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania. Italy, by the clumsy and capricious policy of its ruler, is to-day as isolated in Europe as Germany was on the eve of the world war.

This situation should not close our eyes to the fact that the Italian people in backing up Mussolini are giving proof to the world of the dangerous sentiment of despair—a sentiment founded on the recognition of the fact that no European statesman has the courage to put before the great Powers the simple proposition that Italy, whether Mussolini is in power or not, has certain claims for consideration of her most urgent problems. Mussolini's attitude has had a dangerous reaction in all countries surrounding Italy. Militarism in Switzerland is definitely anti-Italian. At the manœuvres of the Swiss troops, we find the problem posed again and again how to

defend the passes from Switzerland to Italy against an invasion from the South. Large contingents of French staff officers of the highest grades evince to-day the same interest in the results of these manœuvres as the British staff officers did for Belgian preparations to ward off a German surprise attack. France, doubtful whether Switzerland will be able to defend its own territory successfully against an Italian diversion, is building at the expense of fifty million pounds a girdle of the most modern fortifications, constituting " a new Chinese wall," from Verdun to the Mediterranean. Mussolini is meanwhile penetrating the southern departments of France and the most fertile regions of Tunis with Italian immigrants who are to Italianise the thinly populated region and furnish the Duce with an ethnographical pretext for claiming these regions if Italy should ever succeed in beating France on the field of battle.

Mussolini's policy of " threatened expansion " has had an unfavourable reaction in Germany and Austria. In the conversations between French and German statesmen at Geneva, France has expressed the opinion that a rapid evacuation of the Rhineland would only prove acceptable to the French generals if they could secure in exchange for this so-called " concession " a greater degree of security on her entire eastern frontier. French generals and politicians are at present at loggerheads on the question of how quickly the new " Chinese wall " on the eastern frontier of France is to be built. The French generals have given Poincaré to understand

that they would advise the evacuation of the Rhineland before the ultimate dates provided in the Treaty of Versailles if Germany should be able during the next two or three years to raise on the American market the equivalent of the 50 million pounds which the French militarists wish to spend on the " Chinese wall." If France can get that money from Germany more quickly than the French taxpayer and the French Chamber are willing to provide it, the French generals will waive their objection to the evacuation. In Austria Parliament and Government are living in a constant fear of Italian intervention. " If Mussolini should die or be killed to-morrow," a prominent Italian expert on foreign affairs said to the author, " one of the three men who are going to fight to the finish to become his successor will attempt a military diversion on the lines of least resistance. This line of least resistance points to Vienna. Italy, ensconced on the Danube, would have driven a wedge between the two most important partners in the 'Little Entente,' Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia, and would be bordering on its newfound ally, Hungary." How Mussolini's policy impresses observers who are favourable to the Italian point of view can be substantiated by an interesting quotation from the *Saturday Review* :

> " No one who has been in Italy lately can have failed to observe that the one European Power which has any influence on Fascist policy is England. Hitherto that influence has been wisely used in the cause of peace, but it has been used in such

a tactful way that the Fascist rank and file are firmly persuaded that Italy enjoys the full diplomatic support of this country. There are many questions in the Adriatic that cry for urgent settlement, and have been allowed to drift. There is some ground for believing that more energetic British action in Rome would be the best means of effecting an amelioration in Italo-Yugoslav relations. Much as one may admire the achievements of the Duce, there is nothing to be gained by closing one's eyes to the fact that Italian Imperialism constitutes the greatest menace to European peace to-day."

The London *Economist* points out that the eternal feud between Yugo-Slavia and Italy is so dangerous because of its interlocking effect on the problem of Franco-Italian relations. The relations of France and Italy are at issue in the whole basin of the Mediterranean from the Balkans to Tangier. They extend to naval competition, to a rivalry of influence in Spain and Portugal, as well as in the Balkans, and to the penetration of French territory and spheres of influence by Italian immigrants. How Mussolini's foreign policy affects the most pacific-minded politicians and historians of France can be illustrated by Aulard's terse statement " that French democrats wish nothing so earnestly as that the dictatorship of Fascisism shall not plunge Italy into the abyss of a ruinous war—ruinous for Italy as well as for the whole of Europe," and by a tragic epigram, attributed by the Boulevard to Painlevé, the French War Secretary, that French pacifists cannot think about

peace until Italy's war spirit has been forcibly pacified. That this epigram contains more than the customary grain of salt is revealed in a Paris telegram of the British United Press, summarising an interview the French War Secretary gave to the Press after returning from an inspection of the fortifications in process of construction on the eastern frontiers of France. Painlevé declares that these works of defence will be " the most efficient protection against modern aerial and gun bombardment possible to-day.

" The plans include a wall of concrete and steel, beside which the famous " Hindenburg Line " would appear as a mere string of sand castles. " The plans are to be the masterpiece of Marshal Petain, who has been assisted by experts of the War Ministry and the Superior War Council.

" ' We have based the defences on the lessons of the last war,' said M. Painlevé. ' Our scheme is a combination of two plans, the first a sort of continued front line, an organised trench system of steel and concrete. The second is a series of regional strongholds.

" ' We shall push down along the Rhine where it forms our eastern border and up along the German frontier, where Germany holds the left bank of the river. Bridgeheads will come in for special attention, and experts declare that once we have completed the wall of fortifications no soldiery can ever force it.

" ' Our plans do not overlook the south-eastern border, where the Alps divide France and Italy.

There the problem is comparatively easy. The fortification of the Belgian frontier will be less important because we cannot build up impregnable obstacles in face of our friends the Belgians. But it must be remembered that we were attacked once before by an enemy which violated Belgium and marched through that State into France.

" ' I am convinced that the plan will not have any international repercussions. The plan is essentially defensive. Far from being a bellicose manifestation, this gigantic security scheme is really a step forward in our pacific policy.

" ' In general our adopted plan consists of a succession of fortified regions, organised to meet topographical exigencies, and including the building of strategic roads and railways, which will also assist civil development.

" ' The real fortified strongholds will consist of fortresses, batteries, breast-works, and munition stores, concrete gunpits, machine-gun blockhouses, with underground cables for communication.

" ' The work will cost about £50,000,000. This year we are spending £2,500,000.' "

The reaction in Italy is similar to that fatal sequence of scares and counter-scares dominating Anglo-German relations before the war. Painlevé's statements in Paris were answered in Rome in the semi-official *Tribuna* by the allegation of an anti-Italian Franco-British " Air Pact." The diplomatic correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, who cannot be charged with an inclination to exaggerate the aspects of a political situation with an intention

of damaging Italian interests, gives the following review of Roman misgivings :

" Twice in the course of the past week the *Tribuna*, which is regarded as the mouthpiece of the Italian Foreign Office, has published statements alleging that the Governments of Great Britain and France had supplemented their recent Naval Agreement by another, and more informal one, relating to the air. The tone of our Rome contemporary is bitter, as it suggests that, as a consequence of this secret Anglo-French air understanding, France will shortly concentrate the bulk of her air fleet towards the Franco-Italian frontier.

" It is certainly remarkable that these specific allegations by an organ in close touch with Signor Mussolini's Foreign Ministry should not so far have drawn an authoritative and categorical denial from either the Quai d'Orsay or the British Foreign Office. Indeed, they have been met in each case with no more than a vaguely semi-official statement to the effect that ' nothing is known of such an agreement in well-informed quarters.'

" This lack of an emphatic pronouncement by London or Paris has given fresh impetus to the suspicions and suggestions which have been current throughout diplomatic circles in Europe and America for some weeks past, and have created no little ill-feeling towards this country.

" The suggestions, briefly put, are that the Naval Agreement is merely the one avowed and concrete aspect of a much wider understanding, covering the

aerial and diplomatic as well as the naval and military fields between Great Britain and France.

" The statements in question are especially precise, circumstantial, and plausible in regard to the alleged Air Agreement, which, it is asserted here and there, actually preceded the Naval Agreement, and may be held to explain the concession therein made to France concerning the non-limitation of the smaller categories of submarines. It is, indeed, hinted by our foreign and domestic critics that, in return for this concession, France has privately consented not to proceed with her programme for the construction of a chain of powerful aerial bases along the Channel, opposite the British coast, with its main base at Cherbourg.

" France is further credited by the same critics with the promise to Great Britain of freedom to use France's air-bases in proximity to the German frontier, should Germany ever attack Great Britain, without or before attacking France or Belgium. In this way, so runs the argument, a British aerial offensive would best deflect the German air fleet from a massed attack on London. It is added that the recent air manœuvres over London were designed to impress British opinion with the vulnerability of the Empire's capital to an air attack.

" Other proofs adduced in support of the above allegations are the presence of the heads of the British Air Force at the French air manœuvres over Paris, and their inspection of other French aerial bases.

" Of course these allegations assume that the British Government is more concerned with the air than with the submarine peril. Otherwise Great

Britain would have made a very poor bargain indeed in obtaining French assurances against the most unlikely of emergencies—a direct attack by Germany on Great Britain—and an ineffective French moral support for the British Admiralty's standpoint in the matter of light cruisers.

" France, on the other hand, would have secured most tangible advantages, and not only in connection with her submarine programme. For the British Government recently notified the Powers of its acquiescence in the French standpoint concerning the methods of computing war strength (under the head of Military Reserves), one of the chief issues before the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. Incidentally it is claimed by France that, unlike the Naval Agreement, this British concession cannot now be cancelled, should the former agreement be abandoned in the face of American opposition.

" But the charge brought against the British Government, or, at least, some of its members and their Departments, of having entered into informal, and, of course, not strictly binding understandings with France, does not stop here. The point is made that at no time since the Great War has the diplomatic co-operation between London and Paris been so close and constant, and so exclusive (in regard to other Powers) as it has become in recent months. And here, again, there is much talk of an alleged diplomatic bargain, of which the following are said to be some of the main features :

" 1. France abandons her policy of a *rapprochement*, financial and economic, with Soviet Russia,

lest by such means the Soviet campaign against Great Britain, notably in Asia, should be sustained and strengthened.

"M. Briand's vehement denunciation of Soviet Russia at Geneva is cited as an instance of this new French orientation.

"2. Great Britain undertakes to support the French policy of a Serbo-Bulgarian *rapprochement* in the Balkans, contrary to her old anti-Pan-Slav tradition.

"The way in which Great Britain, on August 3 last, pressed Italy to join her and France in putting pressure on the Sofia Government to suppress the Macedonian Committee is mentioned under this head. Italy, it may be added, replied in the negative on August 11, but, without waiting for her reply, Great Britain and France carried out their intention on August 10."

All these allegations were met by the most categorically worded *dementi* the British Foreign Office has in recent years had occasion to publish. Experienced journalists all over the world know, however, that in an atmosphere of suspicion the scaremongers' products are more sought after than the less sensational, unembellished, and unvarnished statements of fact.

CHAPTER IV

THE FATAL ILLUSION

Mussolini's erratic foreign policy, and the wilful self-isolation of Italy as its natural consequence, will not, as some pacifists and anti-Fascists confidently believe, alienate the dictator from the Italian bourgeoisie. The Italian bourgeoisie, confronted everywhere by economic problems and barriers, and dependent on supplies from abroad, can be—with the assistance of a nimble censorship—easily convinced that only the ill-will and jealousy of Italy's neighbours are keeping the Italian people compressed in a heated boiler without any safety valve. If Mussolini were to-morrow to disappear from Italy's public life, all the fundamental economic causes which produced poverty, chaos, and financial disruption before the advent of the dictator would produce the same results. Italy's order and comparative financial stability, the so-called life-work of Mussolini, is more apparent than real. Wages, prices, exchange parity, and so-called prosperity, are artificial and State regulated. Nobody knows what results are attained by the natural " play " of " supply and demand," or by subsidies, subventions, State contracts, and other means of artificial stimulation of production and consumption.

The problems underlying Italy's needs are as old

as the ages. Crispi, an ardent constitutional nationalist, tried out ill-fated colonial experiments to supply his country with foodstuffs and raw materials produced by Italians on Italian soil. Luzatti, Giolitti, Salandra and Nitti tried to impress on the victors of the world war that Italy had entered into the war on the side of the Allies, not only in the hope of re-uniting Italy with the Italian-speaking Austrian territory, but also in the expectation of obtaining a fair share of Germany's colonies. These efforts proved futile, and Italy, after the war, had to continue to send abroad its manhood and to feed its cities by the savings of its emigrants. Tunis and the Argentine were the first objectives. Later on, depopulated France became a favourite haven for Italy's surplus population. The *New Statesman* has recently published a very interesting survey of the influx of Italians into France—a movement of population as fatal to good relations between France and Italy as any clash of policy in the Balkans or colonial rivalry in North Africa. The correspondent of that weekly points out that :

> " Since the war, hundreds of thousands of Italians have moved with their families and household goods into France, and in addition there is the regular number who find employment through the Italian Commissariat of Immigration or French agencies, but perhaps do not settle. The Commissariat has lent itself to the efforts of the Fascist Government to obtain the maximum profit for Italians abroad with the minimum loss to the State. Nevertheless, it is unwelcome news

that the Commissariat has lately ceased to exist as an independent entity in order to become simply a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

" As long as Italian emigration into France was a free economic movement, French public opinion was not greatly disturbed by the formation of self-contained communities, acutely conscious and jealous of their Italianita. It was recognised as inevitable that overcrowding in Italy should be relieved by filling up what the Italians call ' the inexorable void ' in France. The need of the one country is so manifestly the opportunity of the other. Frenchmen recognise, too, that, while some foreign immigrants become good French citizens as a matter of course after a generation or so, others retain their ties with the country of origin much longer.

" But both Government and people resent very strongly the idea that an emigrant population should be used by a foreign Power as a bargaining counter for diplomacy, or as a weapon of expansion, and that is precisely the direction in which Italian policy has been tending.

" The general unsettlement and restlessness caused by the war years, together with the very considerable development of French industry, led to a scarcity of native French labour in the fields. For the first time in history large numbers of the French peasantry began to abandon the soil in favour of the higher wages in the towns. It happened that this phenomenon coincided with the

period of ' Red ' terror in Italy which created quite a panic—especially in the northern provinces—among owners of land and property. The migration *en masse* of an agricultural class is thus easily explained.

" These emigrants, who are mostly of the settler type, sought by preference those districts—the Languedoc of history—where conditions of climate, soil, and crops were most like those at home, and it appears that those who actually bought or hired pieces of land had varying fortunes. Some, we are told, entered into possession of veritable châteaux and estates which had simply been allowed to fall into neglect, and they prospered exceedingly.

" On the other hand, we are advised that some of these Italian emigrants used up all their capital to acquire land—which often turned out to be thoroughly poor—and afterwards they had no money to work it with.

" There are whole districts in which the population is composed almost exclusively of Italians who have bought or hired land and have settled down comfortably with their families on French soil. By courtesy of the French Government they are free to lead their own life, and are bound by the closest of ties to the Commissariat of Emigration in Rome. The fact that their children will presumably be obliged to go to the French schools, and that the French banks refuse to give ' foreigners ' credit, should, however, ensure that the majority of these immigrants will become Frenchmen in the next

generation, unless the Italian Government can induce the French to make still further concessions.

" Early in 1926, Signor de Michelis received precise instructions from his Government to apply the *dopolavoro* policy to the masses of Italian workers abroad. These ' afterwork ' institutions, for giving facilities for the utilisation of the workers' spare time, show the Fascist State making itself responsible for the lighter side of the workers' life, just as, under the régime of compulsory arbitration and collective bargaining, the State takes responsibility for settling the more serious question of economic disputes. The application of this policy, however, may be construed as a covert infringement of the 1919 Convention. It is this, in fact, which started the alarm among patriotic Frenchmen as to how far it would be safe to allow agents of the Italian Government to develop a kind of Italian colony on French soil.

" In all discussions with Frenchmen on the security question, one has to take into account the existence of a ' fear complex ' among the present generation in France, and the same stipulation applies to the question of the Italian occupation of large tracts of French territory.

" The *Journal Officiel* not long ago gave the number of Italian immigrants altogether as 807,650 (nearly double the figure of 1921), which is a little less than half the number of foreigners in France. It is the first time for centuries that a foreign people has taken possession *en masse* of French soil. Small wonder, then, that a certain

section of French opinion is haunted by the spectre of 'a State within the State,' which would indeed be the logical outcome of Signor Mussolini's emigration policy, as it affects these settlers."

This correspondent adds that it is high time that this ghost of fear were laid by a treaty between France and Italy. That not only France, but also the United States, are to-day afraid of the political effect of Italian immigration on the stability of the nation receiving these hyper-Italian immigrants becomes apparent when we consider the "orders of the day" issued by Mussolini to all Fascisti abroad. They have been enumerated by the *New York Times* as follows :

"1. Fascisti abroad must be respectful of the laws of the countries in which they reside. They must give daily proof of their respect for the laws.

"2. They must not participate in the internal politics of the countries where they reside.

"3. They must not create divisions among Italian colonies, but rather heal them under the ægis of Fascism.

"4. They must be examples of uprightness in their public and private lives.

"5. They must respect Italian representatives abroad, and obey their suggestions and commands.

"6. They must defend Italianism in the past and present.

"7. They must give help to needy Italians.

"8. They must be as disciplined abroad as I expect and demand Italians to be disciplined at home."

The *New York World*, recognising the fact that some of these orders are commonplace tenets of public decency and good behaviour, comments on their political significance as follows :

"But when the American Fascist is asked not to participate in the political life of the country, and to obey here the Italian Consuls and other representatives, this is assuming that he will not become an American citizen. When consent is assumed that he shall be disciplined here with the same discipline imposed upon the Fascists of the homeland, this is setting up a kingdom within a kingdom.

"The Fascist attempt to retain a hold upon emigrants in other lands will probably fail in most cases. In so far as it succeeds, it may lead to regrettable consequences. There cannot be two rivals in ultimate authority in the United States any more than in Italy."

Further American comment can be summarised from the *Literary Digest* as follows :

"Mussolini's policy has been to hold the actual allegiance of all Italians wherever they might be. Italy has been unable to take care of her increase in population at home, and it has been necessary

to encourage migration. Unfortunately for Mussolini, with most of the colonial areas of the earth already preoccupied, there is no territory that he can appropriate where his nationals may settle permanently and still retain their allegiance. He has therefore formulated the rather presumptuous plan of endeavouring to retain that allegiance, even though Italians have become naturalised elsewhere.

" This plan constitutes the chief bone of contention between France and Italy, since the French Government resents and fears the operation of a policy that affects so large a number of Italians resident in southern France and in Tunis.

" Much of the recent difficulty in Austria and Hungary has been fostered by Fascists, who have had the sympathy and support of the Government at Rome. Fascism is not subversive of present-day civilisation as Bolshevism, but it is nevertheless contrary to the ideals of Anglo-Saxon democracy, and Great Britain and the United States must, as a matter of principle, resist any pretensions that threaten the stability of Western institutions. Fascism in Italy is a local matter, but when this movement aspires to become an agent of world conquest—when it presumes to build another miniature political State within the democracies of the West—it is time to draw the line.

" If any question involving America's foreign policy, including the Monroe Doctrine, becomes a campaign issue hereafter, Italian-Americans, on Mussolini's orders, must refrain from voting.

From that, of course, is only a step to telling them how they shall vote here.

" Has Russian Communism gone further than that ? There is only one kind of tyranny in government, whether the tyrant is emperor, premier, a committee, a political party, or a party majority. Interference by one Government with the political affairs of another begins when that Government seeks to dictate what residents of that other country shall do, whether those residents are aliens or naturalised citizens. It does not matter whether the nationality of those it seeks to influence are Italian, German, or British.

" Napoleon, drunk with power, at the maddest part of his career never dreamed of such dictatorial power as Mussolini is trying to establish in Italy and elsewhere."

Italy's eternal problem, over-population, has been stated by Mussolini in these terms : " Many nations envy our proletarian nation, intelligent, industrious, locked up in a narrow but divine peninsula, too narrow for our race. All Italians of my generation understand the insufficiency of our territory. It is not surprising, therefore, that our national spirit is sometimes excited, and is even tormented, by imperialistic aspirations. It is only the expression of an historical reality that a young nation has rights at the expense of a nation that has passed its zenith. These rights have been branded with letters of fire in the pages of our history and destiny" (June 5, 1923, at Venice).

Mussolini's brother, in discussing the Kellogg Pact, describes the policy " behind the Pact " as a shabby trick of those nations which had already found a place in the sun, crying out against war merely because they did not want to be disturbed or that others should interfere with their slow absorption of gold and territory.

The *Lavoro d'Italia* publishes a message from its New York correspondent, in which it is declared that " the treaty is, in reality, only a private agreement, by which the world is divided into respective zones of influence between two great divisions of the Anglo-Saxon race. Its ultimate aim is the maintenance of the political, economic, and naval hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race over the whole globe. . . . This treaty is, according to methods dear to Anglo-Saxon mentality, presented as an act of beneficence to the whole of humanity. It will, in fact, on the contrary, not prevent a single war, but will ensure for the Anglo-Saxon race a world hegemony, at least as long as Europe continues to remain in the state of disorder and in the chaos and hatred and mutual jealousy which now rends her."

Discussing problems of disarmament, the *Tribuna* of August 21 refutes French pretensions to be allotted, under a disarmament scheme, a larger navy than Italy because France had to defend her Atlantic coast-line and her colonial possessions. It states that " if France has a great colonial empire to defend, Italy has, in all due time and by the widest stages, a colonial empire to acquire—at least, unless that has become suddenly illegitimate for Italy alone, which until yesterday—that is, until after the war

—in the matter of the division of the German and Ottoman spoils, has been considered glorious in the case of France itself, of England, and also of Belgium, as previously in the case of Spain, Portugal, and Holland. If ever all this talk of disarmament were to become an objectively serious matter, it is to Italy that the stronger forces should be assigned. The best plan is, in any case, to make no hypothesis as regards the future."

Italian intrigues in Albania are a signpost to the direction of Italian expansion. It is also indicated in the conclusion of alliances with Bulgaria and Hungary and in Italy's attempt to rope in Greece and Turkey as rather unwilling partners in her combination of eastern Mediterranean Powers. This point of view is expressed in Mussolini's monthly *Gerarchia*, which states : " For years we have maintained that Italy has assumed a directing function in the Danubian as well as in the Mediterranean zone. To-day we observe with pleasure that this function is spreading towards the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, thanks to a series of facts showing that Italy is the only exclusively Mediterranean great Power. Italy is favouring Greco-Turkish *rapprochement*, not only because she is the third Mediterranean Power, but also because she has always had many vital interests in that area. The most effective guarantee for the political independence and for the economic progress of the small States facing on the Mediterranean does not lie either in the protection of Britain or in the Utopian promises of Moscow. It is based on the solidarity of those small States with Italy which remains the greatest Mediterranean Power."

This fairly harmless interpretation of Italian activity in the Balkans is not subscribed by those Powers involved, neither by Greeks nor by Turks who are to become Italy's allies, least of all by Yugo-Slavia, which is to be put under pressure of this new combine.

The Constantinople *Djoumhouriet* comments as follows : " We are informed that in the meeting between our own Foreign Minister and Sr. Mussolini, Turko-Italian relations were discussed with the idea of bringing about some *rapprochement* between the two countries. We favour the idea in view of our common interests. Yet at the same time we hear quite often that Italy has certain aspirations toward territories of ours. And it is because Fascist Italy continuously comes back to this question that we are a little reserved. Therefore Rome must not complain that some people still believe Italy to be moved by Imperialistic aims. Turkish confidence in Italy has been shaken, and, notwithstanding all the assurances that Rome has always given us, we must act with great reserve and be on our guard. As regards Greece's participation in these negotiations, we must repeat to her that, no matter how many allies she may find, she must carry out her promises to us. She cannot frighten Turkey with new political combinations."

The Athens *Patris* reminds Mussolini that Italy can, by returning to Greece the islands occupied on the coast of Asia Minor, contribute considerably to a relief of tension in south-eastern Europe, and then goes on to say that " any alliance between a small country like Greece and a large Power like Italy is

unthinkable without at the same time accepting the fact that the smaller country would become a dependency of the greater one. . . . More specifically, an alliance with Italy would deprive Greece of any friendly contact with Yugo-Slavia, and would mean the loss for Greece of the sympathies of certain great peoples of the West. But, worst of all, such a Greek alliance with Italy would lead us directly into the Italo-Yugoslav controversy, into which we have no desire to enter. It is known that Italy considers the Balkan peninsula as a zone, not only of economic penetration, but also of colonial expansion. Have we reached the point where we would like to see Greece as a satellite of Italy, a rôle now played by Albania ? "

In Belgrade, the aggressive intentions of the new East European combine under Italian leadership are clearly recognised. The *Novosti* is blunt in describing the antagonism between Italy and Yugo-Slavia in the following terms : " It is a fact that our relations are friendly with Roumania alone. Perhaps they are correct with Austria and Greece. But they are certainly not good with Hungary and Bulgaria, and are certainly serious when we come to Italy. It is a fact that, wherever we turn, we face Italy doing something against us. Albania is not only a protectorate ; she is an Italian colony. Italy has succeeded in thoroughly penetrating into Albania. At the same time, it was a great mistake on our part to enter into a pact with Italy, because in this way Yugo-Slavia becomes the servant of Italy, whereas the only policy that would make for friendlier relations between Yugo-Slavia

and Italy would be the full withdrawal of Italy from the Balkans. Rome is just now drunk with grandiose plans, and Sr. Mussolini thinks that all roads lead to Rome. The recent visits to the Italian capital of the Foreign Ministers of Roumania, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, leave no doubt as to the rôle that Italian policy aspires to play in the east of Europe. It is almost certain that, very shortly, pacts of friendship will be signed between Italy and Turkey, Italy and Greece, and Greece and Turkey. Sr. Mussolini counts on Bulgaria, but our ideal would be the creation of a great State and a great people, with twenty million population, extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, by the inclusion of Bulgaria into Greater Yugo-Slavia."

French reaction to Mussolini's aggressive policy is admirably summed up by Pierre Bertrand, writing in the *Quotidien*, who states that there are sufficient reasons to condemn Fascism, but one of the gravest is the ill-treatment of minorities. Recent speeches of Mussolini, this French journalist continues, have been described as being only " provocations " of Austria too " weak to answer " and of Germany " that has been too far disarmed." That is a mistake. Mussolini's attitude is a provocation of all democratic and pacific Powers of the world. Another French author, Ancel, cannot believe that Mussolini is a free agent, and suspects Great Britain of being the " power behind the Duce." He writes : " In the dam which Great Britain constructs against Russia, Italy must play its part. The Balkans are Russia's traditional highway to the open sea. The owners of the highway to India have decided to bar the

Russian passage to the south. Before the war, Great Britain encouraged German and Austria-Hungarian expansion south-eastwards. To-day Italian Fascism is the new remedy."

It would be a fatal illusion to believe that this trend of Italian policy would be changed if by a stroke of the pen Mussolini or another Italian statesman would return to the policy of strict constitutionalism. Emigration with a national object—penetration of the Balkans and the offer of alliances at the pistol's mouth to Greece and Turkey—would not be given up by Mussolini's successors without equitable compensation. Italy's political and economic situation, unrelieved by any measures of forethought of the other Powers, constitutes a serious menace to peace in the Mediterranean and in south and south-eastern Europe. It is, as the London *Economist* has pointed out, the only serious menace to world peace. Soviet Russia can no longer be regarded as an aggressive menace, because all continental generals are agreed on the fundamental fact that this country cannot organise and carry out a war of aggression, and is, furthermore, by its economic situation, obliged to follow a policy that avoids antagonising the Western world. Every war threat in the Mediterranean, whether Great Britain be directly involved or only indirectly as a neutral obliged to use this great highway of commerce, is a matter of paramount importance to English policy. In the Anglo-French naval compromise, the alleged renewal of the Entente, and the conversations which have taken place between London and Paris whilst the naval experts were discussing the technical

contents of the naval agreement, were a natural reaction of England and France to the new developments in the Mediterranean. The statesmen who expressed doubts whether the Kellogg Pact would abolish war were thinking of the Mediterranean situation we have carefully outlined—not only in so far as it is the handiwork of Mussolini, but in so far as this new configuration of Powers has originated in Italian facts and needs, unalterable by any change of régime. The Entente was turned by German aggressiveness and the erratic foreign policy of William II into a semi-military instrument of defence. The common bond of pacifism is welding the Western democracies, flanked by Belgium and Spain, into a similar defensive unit. American criticism of the Anglo-French naval compromise is entirely misunderstanding the origin of whatever kind of agreement has been arrived at. American opposition has enforced the cancellation of an important measure of protection, deemed necessary by statesmen and military experts of democratic countries, against a new reactionary concentration of force actuated by the most pressing motives of national self-interest. It is Europe's fatal illusion to believe that Mussolini's disappearance would pacify Italy ; it is America's fatal illusion to believe that European democracies can disarm while assertive European Imperialism, under Italian leadership, is arming to the teeth and concentrating smaller Powers in battle array.

CHAPTER V

THE ESTRANGEMENT OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A.

A modern war is technically not feasible when the United States, France, and Great Britain, the three great colonial Powers and producers of raw materials, who have at the same time an industrial system capable of turning that raw material into war supplies, are united on a clear-cut peace policy.

The world war would probably have been avoided, or considerably curtailed, if not localised, when and if the United States, Great Britain, and France had not drifted apart after Roosevelt left the White House. As we have been carefully describing a political situation which may at a moment's notice flare up in a warlike conflagration, the position of the United States and the relations of that country to the modern democracies of Western and Central Europe is of decisive influence.

(*a*) *The Mental Attitude*

In defining the attitude of the American Government and of the American people—not always identical in sentiment and in disposition—we must

bear in mind that European questions only indirectly affect the political and economic interests of the U.S.A. A young people full of idealism, self-contained in civilisation and with a complete economic system of its own, America has always taken a pride in upholding the thesis that its attitude towards the older countries of Europe has been entirely dominated by spiritual and moral aspects. Every American father and mother who saw " the boys " in steel-blue cross the Atlantic " to save European democracy " were firmly convinced that America only entered the war under pressure of the most sublime and idealistic motives and influences. America to this day—if we exclude a few hundred manufacturers of armaments, leather, and dry-goods—as a nation is convinced that it stood to gain nothing by entering the war. France and Italy, according to American ideas, wanted to regain territories wrested from them by alien peoples who, as conquerors, had used their power to coerce the Alsatians and the Italians in the southern provinces of Austria. Great Britain, according to American conceptions, tinged with prejudice, entered the war to defend its front garden, Belgium, and to harm its industrial and naval competitor, Germany. A victory of the Allies was bound, therefore, to enrich or strengthen the original participants of the war. The United States, on the other hand, entered the war, according to American conceptions, with the sole intention of administrating laws of international equity in the formulation of the Peace Treaty.

No American understands that the latter-day prosperity of his country is attributed by Europeans

of all nations and races to American participation in the war, and to the longer duration of the war, whereby European countries were impoverished while Americans supplied European markets ; and that the transfer of gold and American securities to the United States furnished that enormous reservoir of cheap surplus capital that after every relapse following a boom enables the captains of American industry to boost up the prosperity of their country far beyond the bounds of its natural increment. Whenever European and American discuss the question of these perhaps intangible but not immaterial " American war gains," European opinion is always pulled up sharp by the practically unassailable American proposition that not the effects, but only the motives of American action in the last years of the world war should be taken into account. Europeans cannot refute the statement that America had no specific political or material war aim. Wilson's Fourteen Points did not contain a single concrete demand formulated on behalf or in the interests of the American people. America certainly was, according to Wilson's intention and according to the manifested political will of those millions of Americans living outside New York and Chicago, not to be benefited by the war.

Those American mothers who made the supreme sacrifice certainly are entitled to cherish the conviction that theirs was a sacrifice without material or ulterior motives. It is as well to hold all this in mind when we are considering and judging America's attitude in world politics and the inclination of the United States to hold aloof from

new European conflicts, from all animosities, and all the re-formation of armed camps.

(*b*) *The Disappointment*

The mental attitude of the average American regarding the motives of America's participation in the world war is reflected in a slow but insidious change of feeling towards his old comrades in arms. When President Wilson left for Europe shortly after the conclusion of the Armistice, the American nation —if a referendum had been taken on this subject— would have delegated to its President the authority to deal with all European problems in America's name on the broad lines laid down in the Fourteen Points. The very unedifying spectacle of the Paris Conference, the sleight of hand practised by Clemenceau and some military delegates of other allied Powers that managed to allocate America's pet conception of securing peace by the formation of a League of Nations to the background and to an unimportant sub-committee of the Conference, proved the first disappointment for America's masses. The unfavourable impression this procedure created was emphasised by the importance the other Allies attached to the discussion of territorial problems and to the piling up of reparations; thereby incidentally circumventing Wilson's promise that there should be no war indemnities and that both groups of countries should pay their own war costs. The settlement of Asiatic problems—much nearer to the heart and mind of the average American—and the selfishness displayed by the

Great Powers in creating new States—not only according to ethnographical conceptions, but also in close accord with the political convenience of the bigger countries sponsoring the infant States—gave proof to the unsophisticated American that democratic Europe had been quite willing to accept America's material assistance in its hour of need, but that the ideals that had prompted the Americans to render this assistance and the sacrifice entailed by American intervention in European affairs went far beyond the comprehension of the European countries convulsed in the throes of jingoism. The American learnt with keenest disappointment the lesson that, for the European, war was no longer akin to a crusade, but had become as much a game of skill and endurance as a struggle between industrial competitors for an important market.

The American learnt the lesson of disillusionment quick and well. All the eloquence of Wilson against it proved unavailing. The American, for the time being, would have nothing more of intervention in European politics. The American nation turned with scorn its back on a League of Nations incomplete without Russia and Germany, that was, according to inimical American comment, only destined to be "an insurance company of the victors." America refused to ratify the Peace Treaty, it refused to enter the League, and it refused to sanction the guarantee President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had given the French Government concerning the inviolability of French territory. From the point of view of the application of the Peace Treaty, perhaps the most serious consequence

was the refusal of the American banks to have anything to do with financing reparations.

After the withdrawal of America, the Allies had to apply the Treaty with much more vigour than was contemplated at the time of the formulation. American aloofness made it impossible for German Governments to obtain considerable American credits as a means of tiding over periods of reparation payments, whilst economic reconstruction of the new Reich was still going on. American revulsion from participation in European affairs and responsibility for the fate of Europe was complete, with the one exception of the spontaneous fellow feeling of Americans for the poor, the sick, and the hungry in central Europe and Russia. America turned her great-heartedness, that had been despised at the Paris Conference by diplomats and soldiers, to the relief of the sufferings of individual and guiltless victims of the world war. America, the economic unit that refused to lend to Germany those few million dollars that might have averted the occupation of the Ruhr, would, as a charitable organisation, subscribe and organise relief efforts which cost her ten times as much as the loan that was refused.

In the first five years after the war American feeling disengaged itself completely from any closer contact with western European thought and feeling. If the American nation at that time was capable of any political interest in European affairs, this interest, more curious than active, more observant than determining, had a strong accent in favour of Germany. The German republic, getting slowly on its legs, fighting successfully against reactionaries

on the extreme left and on the extreme right, recalled to Americans the early days of the United States, when the thirteen States had to be welded into a political unit strong enough to withstand English attempts to upset the Paris settlement of 1783. French harshness in carrying out the Ruhr venture, Italian brutality in speech and in cultural maltreatment of the Tyrolese German minorities, Poland's aggressiveness, and Austria's needs, all contributed to forge new bonds of personal sympathy between the two great republics : Germany and the United States.

This sympathy has never transgressed the orbit of human feelings. German statesmen have tactfully refrained from all attempts to persuade the United States to take again an active part in European politics. America's neutrality was already in itself of the greatest value to Germany. When this neutrality permitted individual German bankers in the last few years to arrange for considerable German loans for municipalities and industrial undertakings in the U.S.A., the last temptation disappeared for Germany to try to deflect America from its anti-European political sentiments.

Western Europe did very little to encourage in the United States any inclination to take part in recasting the political situation of the Old World. The League of Nations waited six years before admitting Germany. It never made an attempt to get into closer touch with Russia. Disarmament, the problem that was to be solved as soon as possible, according to the preamble of the Peace Treaty, has hardly been touched on its outer fringes. The

disarmament promised to Germany is, as our figures have conclusively proved, still "a scrap of paper," and, as we Germans as political realists will have to admit, is bound to remain so until the situation in the Mediterranean has been definitely and peacefully settled.

French foreign policy, under the psychologically efficient leadership of Briand, did not let things drift, although France did not ratify any debt settlement with the United States. The French Government concluded an arbitration treaty with America outlawing, in its preamble, war; and Briand, skilfully utilising suggestions of American professors, offered to conclude with the United States a bilateral treaty specifically outlawing war of any kind between the two countries. The Secretary of State, Kellogg, accepted the first suggestion, and amended the second suggestion to the extent of inviting France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Germany to sign with the United States a treaty outlawing war. This suggestion of Mr. Kellogg had unexpected consequences. While France and probably Great Britain, if invited, were quite willing to outlaw any possibility of war in their relations with the United States, they felt that they could not give the same undertaking if the Briand proposal was extended to a multilateral treaty embracing six Powers with widely divergent interests. If, for instance, Italy pursued a provocative policy against Yugo-Slavia, or Germany against Poland, France might feel bound, not only by treaties, but in defence of its acquired position in the concert of European power, to intervene on

behalf of the weaker and attacked power. Great Britain might be quite willing to outlaw every contingency of war between herself and the United States, but could easily envisage a situation in the Mediterranean arising out of a conflict of other groups of Powers whereby she would be obliged to defend Egypt in a war which—strictly speaking—could not be described as a war of self-defence of the United Kingdom or of its legitimate possessions overseas. Kellogg's proposals were, therefore, soon restricted in scope to the outlawing of a selfish war of aggression as a method of pursuing "a national policy." The *Daily Herald* states: "The British Government insists on reserving its right to go to war in order to prevent something vaguely referred to as interference in certain unspecified portions of the world. That, again, in itself is sufficient to cover practically every war in which the British Empire has ever been engaged." The Paris correspondent of the *New York Herald* makes the further statement that "French Government circles believe that in the English answer to the Kellogg proposals, while dressing up the Paris reservations in phraseology more attractive to the State Department, the actual importance of these reservations has in no way been abandoned. Upon the fundamentals the French Government authorities regard the British as entirely on their side, and for this reason hope is increasing that Secretary Kellogg will now find it necessary to compromise and come within the realm of the European viewpoint. . . . It is reported that not only was the Quai d'Orsai informed in advance of the direct substance of the British reply,

but also that a certain French expert co-operated with British officials to co-ordinate the French and British viewpoints before the note was actually despatched."

It is already ancient history, and can be clearly read in the appended text of the Kellogg Pact, how far Europe succeeded in imposing its reservations on the broader American ideal of peace amongst nations. In imposing these reservations France came off better than Great Britain. France lives in American memory as the country that suggested a limited anti-war treaty, and she has succeeded, as we have proved on American testimony, in giving the impression to the world that its reservations are essentially British in character.

(*c*) *The British Scapegoat*

The unfortunate failure of the Geneva Conference to limit naval disarmament has done a great deal of harm in the United States. It has created a misunderstanding of the aims of English policy—misunderstandings skilfully underlined by European publicists desirous of currying favour with American public opinion. The reaction of the failure of the Geneva Conference in the administrative sphere was a proposal of the American Government to increase the strength of the navy by leaps and bounds in the next ten years. An American provincial paper framed the problem to which the Coolidge Administration had to find an answer as follows : " Since the Geneva Conference ended in failure, the United States therefore must choose between one of the two

alternatives : firstly, to officially recognise Britain's right to supremacy on the seas and to take second place in responsibility and strength ; or, secondly, to build enough new ships to secure equality. The Coolidge Administration decided to take the latter horn of the dilemma." The Washington *Post* amplifies this " dilemma " by stating : " The duty of providing and maintaining a navy rests upon Congress. It should go ahead and do its duty. It should not make the size of the United States Navy dependent upon the shifty and treacherous manœuvres of foreign Governments. The public is tired of disarmament humbug. What it wants is a navy sufficient to protect the Republic."

The Commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Rear-Admiral Plunkett, put it more bluntly in a public speech in which he declared : " If I read history aright, we are nearer war to-day than ever before, because we are pursuing a competitive trade policy, and crowding other nations into the background. A policy of this kind inevitably leads to war. . . . So long as you dare to contest the control of the sea with your goods, you are going to have war, as sure as you are sitting in this room. So long as we are proceeding on the lines we are following to-day, war is absolutely inevitable. I do not care whether it is with Great Britain, or some other nation, you are going to have war." After the meeting the Admiral was asked whether he anticipated war with Great Britain. His answer was : " Yes, I mean Great Britain, or some other nation whose interests are affected. Great Britain may not herself at the outset declare war, but she will let

some smaller nation do that, and then get behind her." This statement, which has caused a tremendous excitement in the United States and Great Britain, was commented on by the Philadelphia *Evening Public Ledger* as follows :

> " War is a business of statesmen and international politicians given to schemes of empire and nationalistic aggrandisement, and the technique of its originators is never exposed in speeches at public dinners or in the frankly published recommendations of public officials. What Admiral Plunkett and others who believe in the bigger navy scheme have to consider is the technical side of the business of national defence. Another great war may never be. But it is our own notion that public men in places of great responsibility *talk too little, rather than too much, of the hidden forces that tend to bring about international conflicts*. Admiral Plunkett is disposed to believe that some day we shall have to fight the combined naval forces of Japan and Great Britain. In telling frankly what he believes and why he believes it, Admiral Plunkett is doing no more than giving the people of the country the benefit of his knowledge and observations."

" Furthermore," declares the Des Moines *Register*, " we of the United States are certainly in for commercial rivalry with Great Britain all along the line. That does make for problems, and there is no way of eliminating them. Lacking real arrangements for solving them as they arise by conciliation, some are bound to be serious. Add to that certainty a race

in naval armaments, which begins with the idea of parity and proceeds through a series of differences of view as to what parity consists of, and the Admiral Plunketts have all the guarantee they need for the most alarmist predictions they choose in unguarded moments to make." " Admiral Plunkett," notes the New York *World*, " is simply talking ' big navy,' while the Administration's Bill is laying plans for building one." The *World* continues : " If, as the President suggests, it is absurd to take seriously Admiral Plunkett's talk of a menace to this country's safety, and if it is perfectly clear that nothing has suddenly occurred to threaten our security, then why has the President authorised Mr. Wilbur suddenly to propose one of the greatest naval building programmes in the history of the United States ? One year ago Mr. Coolidge told Congress that ' no navy in the world, with one exception, approaches ours, and none surpasses it.' When, one year later, the Administration suddenly and out of a clear sky demands a three quarters of a billion dollar building Bill, what difference is there between Admiral Plunkett's attitude and the Administration's attitude except that one means talk and the other action ? " Finally, the Albany *Knickerbocker Press* observes: " The public will want to know why the responsible naval men feel called upon to use propaganda branded by the President as false to put through a programme of which he approves. Congress, after all, is entrusted with the handling of the nation's funds, and is entitled to the truth about how they shall be spent. If the war talk is a blind, what is the real reason for the billion dollar programme ? " As

the Nashville *Tennessean* reviews the entire situation: "There has been transmitted to Congress by Secretary Wilbur, with the approval of the President, the recommendations of the General Board of the Navy for the largest peace-time naval building programme in the history of the United States. It was less than a year ago that President Coolidge successfully defended the taxpayers against a programme for an enlarged navy that was nothing like as ambitious or as costly as that now proposed. Now what developments have changed the situation? Why should we embark upon the most ambitious peace-time naval programme ever known? Since the President's plea of a year ago, the Geneva Conference has been held, and resulted in failure. Great Britain and the United States were unable to agree upon an extension of the ratio fixed at the Washington Conference for major craft to embrace cruisers and certain auxiliary ships. But the President has been repeatedly quoted since the failure of that conference as believing that it afforded no reason whatever for a startling change in plans and the embarking upon a huge building programme. One searches the world horizon in vain for any sign of war in which the United States might be involved and that would require in its own defence the use of a huge navy. There is not a cloud upon the horizon, nothing to give us concern or to cause us to abandon our traditional policy of refusing to be a party to competitive armaments. There is not a rift in our relations with any single Power that could challenge our supremacy on the seas with our present naval armaments. There are, besides the United States, only two great naval Powers in the world. They

are Great Britain and Japan. Our relations with both countries have never been better than they are at this time. The Japanese delegates to the Geneva Conference exhausted every effort in an attempt to reach an accord that would have effectually limited naval armaments. Of course, the United States needs, and must have, with its increasing world commerce and its far-flung possessions, a moderate navy, one adequate for its own protection. No one can seriously question that fact. But it does not need now the largest peace-time naval programme in its history." Another severe critic of the new naval programme is the Baltimore *Sun*. Recalling the provision in it that would empower the President to suspend construction in the event of an international conference, this paper declares :

" If Mr. Coolidge does not mean to start the nation upon a huge programme of naval expansion, he is bluffing in a manner that is at once derogatory to the dignity of the American people and evil in its world influence. If, on the other hand, Mr. Coolidge actually means to start this nation upon the greatest programme of naval expansion ever contemplated, save on the very eve of the world war, he, at one stroke, gives the lie to his own statements of naval conditions and policies repeatedly preached to the American people, and undertakes to make this nation the pacemaker in a mad race of armaments—a mad race started before America, most fortunate of all nations involved in the World War, has paid the half of its war debt.

" One year ago President Coolidge, in his message to Congress, said : 'When it is considered that no navy in the world, with one exception, approaches ours, and none surpasses it, it cannot be said that our nation is neglecting its national defence.'

" To-day President Coolidge proposes to build, in addition to our ten cruisers of 7,500 tons which are completed, and our eight cruisers of 10,000 tons for which initial appropriations have been made, no less than twenty-five cruisers of 10,000 tons each. And while the Navy Department has not made clear to the public the period in which these twenty-five great warships are to be constructed, enquirers are given to understand that they will be started at the rate of five a year during the next five years.

" If the Coolidge programme is carried out, we shall have 405,000 tons of great cruisers. What does that figure signify ? It signifies nothing less than an open race for supremacy with Great Britain. She has now 358,420 tons of cruisers—built, building, and appropriated for. If the Coolidge plan is carried out, Great Britain will be outclassed in tonnage. That is not all. Execution of the Coolidge plan would give us far superior battle power in cruisers. No less than 194,000 tons of the British cruiser strength is divided into forty boats, giving an average of less than 5,000 tons per boat. All of our strength would be in great 10,000-ton ships, save only ten cruisers of 7,500 tons. In offensive power in battle, our fleet would far outclass the British.

"How does President Coolidge reconcile proposals that would have this effect with his solemn declaration to Congress one year ago that our navy was surpassed by none, and equalled only by one? How does he reconcile an obvious challenge to Britain—the fact of the proposed race is virtually admitted in naval circles—with his statement of only a few days ago that we should build only to satisfy our own needs and without regard to other nations' fleets? How does he reconcile the greatest building programme of peace times with the fact of the entire absence of threat to America from any naval Power? How does he reconcile the proposal of the greatest armament of peace time with his own declarations in favour of disarmament, and his own preaching of disarmament to the nations of Europe?"

The comment that deserves the most careful consideration by American students of politics is furnished by the Newark *News*, which asks:

"What is the purpose of the contemplated $2,500,000,000 programme, of which the $725,000,000 December programme is only a part? Is it proposed to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to prevent Great Britain from dominating the seas as she did in the early part of the world war? The only circumstance under which Britain, as long as she respects her signature to the League of Nations Covenant, could set up a menace to our commerce is in event of her uniting with her fellow League members against a nation that started an aggressive war.

" What the United States, as a non-member of the League, would do in that circumstance is one of the things Europe is most anxious to know. Would we co-operate with the League members, or would we insist upon our right as a neutral to continue trading with the nation disturbing the world's peace ?

" The answer in Secretary Wilbur's proposal is that this country proposes to build such a strong navy that it can stand on its neutral rights and prevent the League members from using the blockade as a weapon for keeping the peace. Is that the helpful answer the American people wish to make ? Do they wish to go on record as saying that security for them means security for their trade, even in times when the other Powers are making a concerted effort to stop aggression and prevent war ? "

The Chief Editor of *Le Journal de Genève*, William Martin, furnishes the answer to the question : Why public opinion in the United States believes that a special effort should be made to protect American interests abroad, chiefly against the possibility of an aggressive British policy. In an article in the *Spectator* he gives the following survey of the impression created by the English policy of the last few years on an intelligent, democratic, and pacifically minded neutral observer :

" The past greatness of Britain is founded upon the fact that its policy—always perfectly coherent —has ever been directed towards the furthering

of the general interests of Europe. This policy centres upon two principles : the one economic, that of Free Trade, and the other political, the Balance of Power. Free Trade is the economic doctrine of a nation endowed by nature and industry with advantages superior to those of other nations.

" Thanks to her insular position, and consequent immunity from invasion, Britain possessed vast financial reserves, and the Bank of England dominated the world. Her power was due to those first essentials—the progress which she had made in the development of machinery, and to her fleet, and the outlets which such a fleet made possible. The fiscal policy of such a nation is Free Trade. Quite naturally, under these conditions, the policy was conservative—that is to say, pacific. Wealth supported this outlook. The constant need of British policy was not to admit that any other nation could possibly offend her.

" Balance is a principle of strength—but it is also a principle of peace. The long-drawn-out war, too costly and too destructive even for British shoulders to support, has changed all that. The gold reserves have vanished ; the outlets are closed. Throughout the world new industries, capable of competing with British trade, have been created, and to crown this misfortune competition in the coal trade from electricity and petrol has rendered coal no longer a staple industry. British coal-mines, hitherto accustomed to rule the markets, find themselves menaced by competition which reaches

their very doors. They have done what all industries do when they are upon the defensive—they have clamoured for Protection. Now this is natural, but fatal ; for if Free Trade assures peace, Protection in its essentials is a doctrine of war. Protection raises the cost of living, lowers the level of the life of nations, and engenders discontent. Protection permits the existence of artificial industries, the reality of which from an economic standpoint is not justified. It inclines States toward autarchy ; to become self-centred, and to suffice unto themselves ; or, in other words, to prepare for war and to ridicule blockade—Britain's great weapon.

" Formerly the guardian of Continental balance of power, Britain is to-day confronted by world problems. She is on the defensive in her policy just as she is in her economy. No one can reproach her for this, but the fact remains. It means that Great Britain, in the eyes of the European nations, has ceased to be the great protecting Power for peace. Upon an essential point—the Geneva Protocol—British policy is contrary to the interests of the small Powers. One sees the traditional rôle of Great Britain on the Continent slipping little by little into the hands of France, which is less well equipped to stand the strain.

" Having failed to understand soon enough—in 1914—the necessity of finding an outlet for her isolation, Great Britain bears to-day the consequences of a terrible war. Outside observers sometimes ask themselves whether she is not tending

to repeat a mistake of the same kind. It appears certain to them that by reason of her wide political interests Britain is not in a position to remain detached from any conflagration of importance which she herself may produce. What do they ask of her ? To say in advance that she will not so stand aloof. Her declaration will suffice, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, to prevent war. Far from increasing the risks to her, her word would reduce them to nothing. On the other hand, such risks would actually be created by her silence.

" Moreover, we cannot see how it would be possible for Britain, not only to take no interest in the security of Europe (this is obvious), but, further, to take no interest in its greatness and prosperity. For a long time Great Britain was strong enough to address Europe in the name of her world interests. Britain, to the nations of Europe, was backed by the universe. To-day this situation is reversed. Britain is no longer able to speak for the world, which has outgrown her. Neither the United States nor even the British Dominions would tolerate such a position. There now remains no other resource for her greatness than to speak in the name of Europe to the world."

We see how the atmosphere for complete misunderstanding of the Anglo-French naval compromise was growing up—not only in the United States, but also in those countries outside Great Britain and France who were not in full possession of facts and motives of that fundamentally harmless

and, if properly understood, truly pacific agreement if and so far as it stood alone. A typical provincial paper of the United States, the *Manchester Union*, voiced the restrained American criticism as follows :

" The attitude of the United States on the cruiser question at Geneva last year was in sharp contrast with the British position. Great Britain favoured the limitation of 10,000-ton cruisers armed with eight-inch guns, but insisted on building many smaller-type cruisers armed with six-inch guns. This demand was plainly favourable to the British system of naval bases, and distinctly detrimental to the American system with its few naval stations. The 10,000-ton cruiser is not essential for the protection of British trade routes. The frequency of naval bases makes it possible for Great Britain to operate smaller ships with a restricted cruising radius, that could not be employed with advantage by the United States. Great Britain offered to set a gross tonnage for cruisers within which any country could build, but it was immediately apparent that such a provision would place the United States at a disadvantage unless parity could be achieved regarding the size of cruisers. This was the rock on which the Geneva Conference was wrecked, and, unless the Anglo-French agreement has pointed out some way of breaking this deadlock, it is irrelevant, as a means of compromise, from the American point of view.

" It was hoped when the announcement of the

agreement was first made that France and Great Britain had reached an understanding on the submarine question that would enable Great Britain to modify her position regarding cruisers. It was felt that if Great Britain has persuaded France to limit her submarine programme, this action might materially affect the former's cruiser policy. But if, as now seems probable, France has simply joined Great Britain in urging the British position on the Preparatory Commission at Geneva, the agreement has a purely European significance. America's plan of naval limitation has been clearly stated. This plan is vital to our safety, and, while the Government at Washington will not hold aloof from any effort after the restriction of armaments and the removal of competition in arms, it must be understood that on certain principles which we consider essential to our national well-being we must remain inflexible."

The *Virginian-Pilot* described the Anglo-French compromise as an adjustment of what appeared to be a more or less localised controversy between France and England, arising partly out of France's fear of the British Navy and its determination to retain the fullest freedom in the development of the submarine as a protective device, and partly out of England's fear of the French submarine and the French Army, with its rapidly expanding air forces.

"But this more or less localised controversy may be said to have exercised a powerful influence on British naval policy, both at Washington and at

Geneva. With France refusing to make concessions in the matter of the submarine, and building up a large military air force at the same time, England found it more difficult to agree to proposals for naval limitation in general than would otherwise have been the case. The Franco-British naval compromise is not, however, without possible drawbacks. France and England arrived at their understanding without consulting Italy, which, as one of the chief Mediterranean Powers, is interested in whatever military or naval policies France may pursue. The Italian reaction to the Franco-British compromise on armaments remains to be disclosed. Until it is made completely clear, it cannot be said that the way has been cleared for a solution of the problem of naval limitation likely to arise during the next few years. As for the matter of limiting land armaments, that remains, as always, a most difficult question, in answering which not only France, England, and Italy must have a voice, but also Germany, Russia, and, probably, Japan. The prospect in this quarter is not yet either clear or promising."

The impression that is at present uppermost in the minds of American politicians and naval experts has been admirably summarised in an article in the London *Sunday Express* by the American correspondent of that paper, who states :

" The basic cause of Washington's uneasiness is believed to be the feeling that Sir Austen Chamberlain's action has encouraged the British and

French technical naval advisers to reach an agreement between themselves for the unified action of the British and French Fleets in the event of certain future emergencies, which might possibly be antagonistic to United States interests.

" It is being pointed out that the British and French naval strategy boards could go ahead with a plan for joint naval future warfare without any formal political agreement, and with everything ready for instant action in the event of political consent being given for actual belligerent co-operation on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities. This possibility is considered as practically wiping out the Wilsonian principle of ' open covenants openly arrived at.' At the same time, curiosity is expressed as to whether or not the American Navy Department's strategists have some such similar agreement—perhaps quite informally arranged—as, for instance, between the United States and Brazil. It is known that the American Naval Commission is responsible for the technical efficiency of the Brazilian Navy, and in the event of a war involving the United States in such a way as to require an augmentation of the American Navy, there is a strong suspicion that Brazil would probably immediately become America's fullest ally.

" The situation, therefore, has complications which are apparent on the surface, and it is being

predicted that eventually the great Powers may have to reach an agreement not only barring secret political alliances and ententes, but also secret agreements among their technical strategic boards. The New York *Evening Telegram*, one of the Scripps-Howard group of newspapers, which is always friendly to Anglo-American co-operation, prints a despatch from Washington, saying : ' Inspired Press stories from London suggesting that Great Britain is getting ready to throw overboard the semi-secret Anglo-French naval agreement have increased rather than allayed Washington's suspicion.'

" That agreement, which many American observers interpret as a revival of the Anglo-French military and naval alliance (this time aimed in part directly against the United States), has probably done more to injure the relations between the two English-speaking Powers than anything since the Great War. This situation will be the occasion for an important series of conferences between Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Kellogg.

" It is now clear beyond question that the American Government's resentment over the Anglo-French agreement caused Mr. Kellogg to refrain deliberately from visiting London, and to go direct from Paris to Ireland. It is equally clear that, following the Coolidge-Kellogg conference, the State Department will express to London its strong disapproval. Whether this will be done through a formal Note or by informal conversations is still to be decided.

" The absence of rejoicing at Washington over London reports that the agreement is now dead is explained by the common knowledge that the British Government is under a slashing and almost unanimous attack at home for this ' blunder,' which now makes denials and apparent retreat politically expedient, but diplomats point out such a basic Anglo-French agreement resulting from London's patient negotiations and the revamping of policy over a period of many months cannot and will not be killed in a day by official gestures and announcements to meet domestic and foreign criticism.

" The *Evening Post*, in a leading article headed ' Too Secret,' assumes that the pact is now dead, and says, ' No responsible person asks for publicity during the negotiations of a treaty or other international agreement. Any proposal of importance would be wrecked in advance by such procedure. On the other hand, any Government which withholds publication of an instrument which has been approved by the contracting Powers invites the ruin of their labours.'

" This morning's *World*, in a leader also assuming that the pact is killed, says :

" ' The whole affair has had one gratifying side—that it showed the instant opposition of the world's opinion to special and secret compacts between two great Powers, or anything which remotely looks like such compact ; if progress is to be made in disarmament it will have to be on a franker basis.' "

Thoughtful English students of politics are doing their best to dispel the fog-clouds of misunderstanding. The *Round Table* urges on America that a continued peace and prosperity which that country needs can best be guaranteed by co-operation with the rest of the world to end war by establishing that arbitral alternative to war which she has always advocated in the past. On the British point of view that magazine states that: "The days of her Imperial temptations are over. She is no longer the only sea Power in the world. The choice before her is whether she will be prepared, not to relinquish her naval strength or her right to protect her vital communications against improper attack, but to recognise that she must only use it to interfere with the trade of other nations in accordance with international law and in support of peace through arbitration. That may seem difficult. But the long view shows that it is by the limitation not of her rights as a belligerent, but of her rights to become a belligerent, that her trade and that peace which is her greatest interest are secured. If she refuses she will simply impose competition on the United States under conditions which will justify such competition, and in such a contest the greater purse will prevail. . . . Finally, there are the other nations of the English-speaking world. They have also an indispensable part to play. They are as vitally interested as the two principal parties. A quarrel between the United States and Great Britain would tear Canada asunder and imperil all the others. Genuine Anglo-American co-operation must be the cardinal purpose of their foreign policy. They, and especially Canada, are

the natural intermediaries between London and Washington. Personal contact between the statesmen of Great Britain and the United States—of the kind that has taken place between Sir Austen Chamberlain, M. Briand, and Dr. Stresemann with such good results for Europe in the last three years—is difficult to bring about for reasons of distance. But it can to a great extent be supplied through Ottawa. The younger nations can, anyhow, help to remove misunderstandings and see that the lack of touch which did so much to cause the Geneva failure does not occur again. The first stage in the solution of this fateful naval question may well be the Imperial Conference of 1929, when the question of how and to what extent the Washington treaties are to be renewed will come up for decision."

The London *Spectator* puts the problem of Anglo-American relations in a nutshell in stating that " the one preliminary condition to Anglo-American naval disarmament is an understanding about the question of the freedom of the sea and about Anglo-American co-operation in enforcing a legalised conception of that freedom by the united navies of both countries. The *Spectator* utters one important warning in offering England's most willing co-operation : " Americans must forgive our saying that they do not yet realise the value, the necessity, of precision in words. There are plenty of reasons for this, into which we need not go now, but an example should show what we mean. President Wilson spoke with the best of intentions of such things as ' self-determination ' and ' national aspirations,' and thereby he caused himself and all Europe a world of trouble.

He had not thought out the meaning and effect of his phrases. If we and America are to co-operate, there must be no misunderstanding due to catchwords or ill-defined phrases. Our readers, British and American, will be thinking of one which is in their minds, if not upon their lips. It is ' the freedom of the seas.' We here are all for that freedom. We are neither too proud nor too humble to claim, and we fear no contradiction of our claim, that the British Navy has been the greatest human instrument by which, under God, has been created and preserved the free use of the seas as highways for mankind, assured routes for man's traffic by which his civilisation has progressed and the gifts of nature have been spread among the nations and the earth replenished. But there is a bastard meaning attached by thoughtless people to the phrase, as though it meant the freedom of nations to prolong for their own material benefit the horrors of war waged by other unfortunate belligerents ; freedom to aid and comfort belligerent armies fighting in other lands across the sea, in utter disregard or flagrant contempt of that neutrality which the Law of Nations most solemnly enjoins upon all non-combatant peoples. Though we owe to America the inspiration of the Covenant of the League, it is Europe rather that we would remind that this Covenant sanctions the principle of outlawing war by blockade. To the United States we say that there is no way in which we would sooner co-operate with them than in proclaiming to the world that, if Satan should prevail and war unhappily arise, the Atlantic navies will be found sharing the work of keeping the seas free from all that

might supply combatants with the means of prolonging war."

Commenting on the unfavourable reply of the United States to the Anglo-French naval compromise, " Scrutator " makes in the *Sunday Times* the following concrete proposal for an Atlantic Pact :

> " The great common interest of this country and America is to keep the North Atlantic open to their trade. An agreement between us and America that they would neither interrupt each other's sea-borne commerce in war time in the North Atlantic, nor allow any other Power to interrupt it, would make us blockade-proof, and at the same time remove the one outstanding difference between us on sea law, out of which the last war between this country and America in 1812 arose. Such an agreement would not necessarily be confined to our two countries, but would be open to the subscription of other nations, and the result would be a new peace of the sea such as has not been known since Justinian said, '*Ego terræ dominus, lex maris.*' "

(*d*) *The Tripartite Problems*

The practical conclusion at which we arrive after reviewing the misunderstandings of the last few years is this : Can France, England, and the United States agree on measures political and economic that are to be adopted as soon as a country—either by warlike action, economic aggressiveness, or the conclusion of military alliances—endangers the peace of Europe? Can America, England, and

France devise a means whereby reparations and war debts can be used as a lever to effect *a final settlement of the most important European problems, such as Italy's colonial aspirations, the needs of Austria, the settlement of the most important problems between the Baltic States, the conclusion of a durable, political, and economic understanding between Poland and Germany and the evacuation of the Rhineland*? Any European war of a wider ramification is surely a much more costly experiment than any system of financial concessions that may be mutually made between the Great Powers now tied up by fantastical arrays of figures—figures that will never materialise, because they were conceived at a period of the world's history when man thought in terms of hatred and oppression and could not envisage the ricocheting effect of a policy of vindictiveness pursued in the field of economics. A new American Administration can, in raising the debt question, of its own free will, use it as a lever to force Europe to put its house in order. It does not entail new American intervention ; it only entails America's will to settle old claims on equitable terms.

The serious diagnosis of the political situation in Europe which we have tried to outline in the last chapters has been summed up by Phillip Kerr in the *Observer* in these courageous words :

> "The one hope of lasting peace in Europe—and the world—therefore, is that the nations should renounce war or the threat of war—with its necessary corollary, huge armaments and military alliances—as the instruments of their national policy, and organise an effective alternative

pacific procedure. Unless they do this, world war is inevitable—a decade or so ahead."

Discussing the Anglo-American situation, Kerr is not less outspoken :

> " If it were not for the Peace Pact this situation would be quite extraordinarily dangerous. But the Peace Pact points the way out of the naval impasse just as the Covenant points the way out of the European impasse. For the Peace Pact lifts the discussion away from the question of what is to happen in the event of war by pledging its signatories to find the way to avoid war and to settle every dispute by pacific means. Moreover, it opens the way to a settlement of the only real difficulty in Anglo-American relations—the question of interference with neutral trade in time of war, because it transforms altogether the old law about ' belligerent rights ' at sea, except against an outlaw State.
>
> " The implications of the Peace Pact cannot be further pursued here. But it is clearly the only road by which competition in naval armaments and eventual war can be prevented."

These commentators who are tendering most valuable and frank advice about what Great Britain and Europe should do are inclined to overlook that Europe unaided is not strong enough to enforce a Peace policy. They are inclined to overrate the power and influence of pacific-minded European statesmen like Briand, Stresemann, and

Sir Austen Chamberlain on those European forces and personalities who prefer less lawful and pacific solutions of their country's most urgent problems. In advising what to do to guarantee peace, these able commentators should devote occasionally a little more thought and attention to America's hitherto predominant inclination to adopt an attitude of aloofness as regards European conflicts. If these politicians in Europe are rightly so afraid to let matters drift because they foresee situations parallel to those in which the world war originated, they cannot hope to appeal for American assistance unless they succeed in demonstrating to the satisfaction of American public opinion that American intervention is not destined to be an intervention in favour of Party A or Party B in a European conflict, but that the States, faithful to the ideals which prompted their entry into the world war, could use the lever of the inter-Allied debts to make peace secure for all States, large or small. The American reader of my little pamphlet may be inclined to pose the question whether a mere European, an inhabitant of that old but warlike continent, is entitled to ask America " to come in again." The answer to that question is a simple statement which thoughtful Americans have already framed, and goes far beyond the recent cautious invitation of the U.S. Government in its note to Great Britain (see Appendix B) to continue the too limited discussion of naval disarmament on a new basis.

EPILOGUE

The most elaborate programme yet evolved by Americans for safeguarding peace, to which every European can whole-heartedly pledge himself, has been formulated by the Washington *News* in six points—less complicated than President Wilson's programme, but more practical and probably more acceptable to every democracy intent on abolishing war: "War," this paper states, "is a hard-boiled proposition, like burglary or hijacking. You can't abolish it merely by outlawing it. There are six fundamentals necessary even to a fair assurance of world peace:

"1. The codification of international law, or the framing of the simple rules of fair play under which the civilised Powers agree to live.

"2. The outlawry of war.

"3. Compulsory conciliation, in some form, on the Hughes-Havana thesis that there can be 'no international dispute, no matter how serious, which cannot be settled peaceably if the parties really desire a pacific solution.'

"4. Making that nation an outlaw nation which refuses to abide by the simple rules agreed upon and declares war in violation thereof.

" 5. All nations to pledge themselves not to have any dealings, commercial or otherwise, with an outlaw nation ; in other words, to boycott it.

" 6. Limitation of armament.

" Into this scheme of things the World Court, the Hague Arbitration Tribunal, and arbitration and conciliation pacts, would fit admirably. And, while it would have to be world-wide in scope, there is nothing to prevent it from being applied regionally ; that is to say, by geographical groupments. Here, of course, we have a sort of *world association to keep the peace*, but no supergovernment—an international association pledged to *a simple code of fair dealing, with powerful sanctions for those that broke the law.*"

On the tenth anniversary of the Armistice, after the American gesture embodied in the Kellogg Pact, Europe is entitled to ask this one question : Do the majority of the electors of the United States wish to witness a repetition of the horrors of the world war, or are they willing *to pledge the political and economic influence of their great country on behalf of the above-mentioned six points*, not elaborated by Europeans, but put forward by fellow Americans ? Shall peace be transferred from the sphere of hopes and ideals to the reality of our everyday life ? Will America enforce, after a settlement of the outstanding conflicts of Europe, the six points with the same strictness with which every civilised nation enforces the *rights of property* and the *sanctity of individual life* ? If, in the drabness of everyday life, we common mortals, full of weakness and failing, may perhaps not be

entitled to a full answer to these questions *to-day* of all days, when our minds turn to battlefields and graveyards, that answer is due, if not to us, at least to the memory of all those who have a claim on us to safeguard *their only right existing beyond the grave* : THE RIGHT NOT TO HAVE DIED IN VAIN ! !

APPENDIX A

INTRODUCTION

As an illustration of the parallel development of peace treaties and treaties envisaging the possibility of war, we have published in the following Appendix the Covenant of the League, restraining but not abolishing war ; the Kellogg Pact, abolishing self-interested war, but legalising wars of self-defence, and the treaties between France, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugo-Slavia, typifying the old order of things, the old type of military defensive and offensive alliance framed in League of Nation terminology and even registered with the League. The treaty between France and Roumania, containing the most explicit pledges of mutual military assistance, has never been published, but only summarised in a version contested by the French Foreign Office. We wish to draw the attention of our readers to the contradiction in spirit of the two world treaties and the national alliances. The treaties Italy has concluded with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Turkey follow the lines of the post-war national alliances.

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

[THE PREAMBLE]

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just, and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE I [MEMBERSHIP]

1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member

of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE 2 [EXECUTIVE MACHINERY]

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

ARTICLE 3 [ASSEMBLY]

1. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

ARTICLE 4 [COUNCIL]

1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the

Principal Allied and Associated Powers,[1] together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece shall be members of the Council.

2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be Members of the Council[2]; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.[3]

2 *bis.*[4] *The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and conditions of re-eligibility.*

3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

[1] The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are the following: the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan (see Preamble of the Peace Treaty with Germany).

[2] In virtue of this paragraph of the Covenant, Germany was nominated as a Permanent Member of the Council on September 8, 1926.

[3] The number of members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to six instead of four by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Third Assembly on September 25, 1922. By a resolution taken by the Assembly on September 8, 1926, the number of members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to nine.

[4] This Amendment came into force July 29, 1926.

4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a Member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

ARTICLE 5 [VOTING AND PROCEDURE]

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 6 [SECRETARIAT]

1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person

named in the Annex ; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

5.[1] *The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly.*

ARTICLE 7 [SEAT. QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICIALS. IMMUNITIES]

1. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

2. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE 8 [REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS]

1. The Members of the League recognise that the

[1] This amendment came into force on August 13, 1924 ; the paragraph originally ran : " The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

ARTICLE 9 [PERMANENT MILITARY COMMISSION]

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.

ARTICLE 10 [GUARANTEES AGAINST AGGRESSION]

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE 11 [ACTION IN CASE OF WAR OR DANGER OF WAR]

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 12 [DISPUTES TO BE SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION OR INQUIRY][1]

1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration *or judicial settlement* or to inquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months

[1] The Amendments in italics came into force on September 26, 1924.

after the award by the arbitrators *or the judicial decision*, or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE 13 [ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES]

1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration *or judicial settlement.*

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement.*

3. *For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.*

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award *or decision* that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against any Member of the League that complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award *or decision*, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE 14 [PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE]

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 15 [DISPUTES NOT SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION]

1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration *or judicial settlement* in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either

unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report

made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE 16 ["SANCTIONS" OF THE LEAGUE]

1. [1]Should any Member of the League resort to war in

[1] *When sufficient ratifications have been received this paragraph will be replaced by the following four :*

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, and to prohibit all intercourse at least between persons resident within their territories and persons resident within the territory of the covenant-breaking State and, if they deem it expedient, also between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse at least between persons resident within the territory of that State and persons resident within the territory of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not, and, if they deem it expedient, also between the nationals of that State and the nationals of any other State whether a Member of the League or not.

It is for the Council to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken place. In deliberations on this question in the Council, the votes of Members of the League alleged to have resorted to war and of Members against whom such action was directed shall not be counted.

The Council will notify to all Members of the League the date which it recommends for the application of the economic pressure under this Article.

Nevertheless, the Council may, in the case of particular Members, postpone the coming into force of any of these measures for a specified period where it is satisfied that such a postponement will facilitate the attainment of the object of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, or that it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience which will be caused to such Members.

disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE 17 [DISPUTES WITH NON-MEMBERS]

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of Membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provision of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 18 [REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION OF ALL FUTURE TREATIES]

Every treaty of international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagements shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE 19 [REVIEW OF TREATIES]

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 20 [ABROGATION OF INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS]

1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE 21 [ENGAGEMENTS THAT REMAIN VALID]

Nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE 22 [MANDATORIES, CONTROL OF COLONIES AND TERRITORIES]

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the

performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

["A" Mandates]

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

["B" Mandates]

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or

military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

["C" Mandates]

6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE 23 [SOCIAL ACTIVITIES]

Subject to and in accoradnce with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League :

(*a*) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and

children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations ;

(*b*) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control ;

(*c*) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs ;

(*d*) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunitions with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest ;

(*e*) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914–1918 shall be borne in mind ;

(*f*) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

ARTICLE 24 [INTERNATIONAL BUREAUX]

1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

2. In all matters of international interest which are

regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

ARTICLE 25 [PROMOTION OF RED CROSS]

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

ARTICLE 26 [AMENDMENTS]

[1] mendments to this Covenant will take effect when

[1] *When sufficient ratifications have been received this Article will read :*
Amendments to the present Covenant the text of which shall have been voted by the Assembly on a three-fourths majority, in which there shall be included the votes of all the Members of the Council represented at the meeting, will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives composed the Council when the vote was taken and by the majority of those whose Representatives form the Assembly.
If the required number of ratifications shall not have been obtained within twenty-two months after the vote of the Assembly, the proposed amendment shall remain without effect.
The Secretary-General shall inform the Members of the taking effect of an amendment.
Any Member of the League which has not at that time ratified the amendment is free to notify the Secretary-General within a year of its refusal to accept it, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

TEXT OF KELLOGG PACT

The text of the treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, which was signed in Paris on Monday, August 27, 1928, is as follows :

The President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland,

Deeply sensible to their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind ; persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made, to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated ;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty ;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and, by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force, bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilised nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy ;

Have decided to conclude a treaty, and for that purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries. . . . Who, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE 1.—The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE 2.—The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE 3.—The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at . . .

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at . . . and the Treaty shall, immediately upon such deposit, become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties thereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of . . . to furnish each Government named in the preamble, and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty, with a certified copy of the Treaty, and of every instrument

of ratification of adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of . . . telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in the French and English languages, both texts having equal force, and hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at . . . the . . . day of . . . in the Year of Our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and twenty . . .

TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND FRIENDSHIP
between
FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
SIGNED AT PARIS, JANUARY 25, 1924

The official French text communicated by the representatives of the French Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic on the Council of the League of Nations. The registration of this Treaty took place March 15, 1924.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC,

being earnestly desirous of upholding the principle of international agreements which was solemnly confirmed by the Covenant of the League of Nations,

being further desirous of guarding against any infraction of the peace, the maintenance of which is necessary for the political stability and economic restoration of Europe,

being resolved for this purpose to ensure respect for the international juridical and political situation created by the Treaties of which they were both signatories,

and having regard to the fact that, in order to attain this object, certain mutual guarantees are indispensable for security against possible aggression and for the protection of their common interests,

have appointed as their plenipotentiaries :

FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC :

M. Raymond POINCARÉ, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC :

M. Edvard BENES, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

who, after examining their full powers, which were found in good and due form, have agreed to the following provisions :

ARTICLE 1.—The Governments of the French Republic and of the Czechoslovak Republic undertake to concert their action in all matters of foreign policy which may threaten their security or which may tend to subvert the situation created by the Treaties of Peace of which both parties are signatories.

ARTICLE 2.—The High Contracting Parties shall agree together as to the measures to be adopted to safeguard their common interests in case the latter are threatened.

ARTICLE 3.—The High Contracting Parties, being fully in agreement as to the importance, for the maintenance of the world's peace, of the political principles laid down in Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919, and in the Protocols of Geneva dated October 4, 1922, of which instruments they both are signatories,

undertake to consult each other as to the measures to be taken in case there should be any danger of an infraction of these principles.

ARTICLE 4.—The High Contracting Parties, having special regard to the declarations made by the Conference of Ambassadors on February 3, 1920, and April 1, 1921, on which their policy will continue to be based, and to the declaration made on November 10, 1921, by the Hungarian Government to the Allied diplomatic representatives,

undertake to consult each other in case their interests are threatened by a failure to observe the principles laid down in the aforesaid declarations.

ARTICLE 5.—The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they are in complete agreement as to the necessity, for the maintenance of peace, of taking common action in the event of any attempt to restore the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany, and they undertake to consult each other in such a contingency.

ARTICLE 6.—In conformity with the principles laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree that if in future any dispute should arise between them which cannot be settled by friendly agreement and through diplomatic channels, they will submit such dispute either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to such other arbitrator or arbitrators as they may select.

ARTICLE 7.—The High Contracting Parties undertake to communicate to each other all Agreements affecting their policy in Central Europe which they may have previously concluded, and to consult one another before concluding any further Agreements. They declare that, in this matter, nothing in the present Treaty is contrary to the above Agreements, and in particular to the Treaty of Alliance between France and Poland, or to the Conventions and Agreements concluded by Czechoslovakia with the Federal Republic of Austria, Roumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or to the Agreement effected by an exchange of notes on February 8, 1921, between the Italian Government and the Czechoslovak Government.

ARTICLE 8.—The present Treaty shall be communicated to the League of Nations in conformity with Article 18 of the Covenant.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Paris as soon as possible.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries, being duly empowered for this purpose, have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Paris, in duplicate, on January 25, 1924.

(L. S.) (*Signed*) R. POINCARÉ.
(L. S.) (*Signed*) DR. EDVARD BENES.

POLITICAL AGREEMENT
between
FRANCE AND POLAND

SIGNED AT PARIS, FEBRUARY 19, 1921

French official text, communicated by the French Representative on the Council of the League of Nations and by the permanent Polish Delegate accredited to the League of Nations. The registration of this agreement took place July 2, 1923.

The POLISH GOVERNMENT and the FRENCH GOVERNMENT, both desirous of safeguarding, by the maintenance of the Treaties which both have signed or which may in future be recognised by both Parties, the peace of Europe, the security of their territories and their common political and economic interests, have agreed as follows :

(1) In order to co-ordinate their endeavours towards peace, the two Governments undertake to consult each other on all questions of foreign policy which concern both States, so far as those questions affect the settlement of international relations in the spirit of the Treaties and in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(2) In view of the fact that economic restoration is the essential preliminary condition of the re-establishment of international order and peace in Europe, the two Governments shall come to an understanding in this regard, with a view to concerted action and mutual support.

They will endeavour to develop their economic relations, and for this purpose will conclude special agreements and a Commercial Treaty.

(3) If, notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful views and intentions of the two Contracting States, either or both of them should be attacked without giving provocation, the two Governments shall take concerted measures for the defence of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests, within the limits specified in the preamble.

(4) The two Governments undertake to consult each other before concluding new agreements which will affect their policy in Central and Eastern Europe.

(5) The present Agreement shall not come into force until the commercial agreements now in course of negotiation have been signed.

PARIS, *February 19, 1921.*

(*Signed*) A. BRIAND.
(*Signed*) E. SAPIEHA.

TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND YUGO-SLAVIA

The Treaty between France and Yugo-Slavia is not yet available in English. This treaty provides that all disputes between France and Yugo-Slavia—if they should ever occur—should be submitted to arbitration and that war is outlawed from the mutual relations of these two countries.

Article 3 and Article 4 of the Treaty contain the conditions of alliance. In Article 3 the French and the Yugo-Slavian Governments pledge themselves to examine in unison all questions affecting the security of France and Yugo-Slavia and other questions affecting the security of France and Yugo-Slavia and other questions affecting the conditions laid down in treaties concluded either by France or by Yugo-Slavia (Peace Treaties). In Article 4 France and Yugo-Slavia pledge themselves to concert their efforts in safeguarding their legitimate national interests. In Article 5 the two countries will co-operate in case the political status of Europe should be changed ; and in Article 6 they pledge themselves to exchange constantly their views on the European situation.

APPENDIX B

To enable our readers to form an independent judgment of the merits of the controversy ranging round the Anglo-French naval compromise, we publish the "disclosure" in the *New York World* of a French diplomatic document addressed to French missions abroad, dealing with this subject, without assuming any responsibility for the verbal correctness of contents or translation from French into English.[1]

The French Diplomatic Circular.

"The limitation for which the conference for disarmament will sit deal with the following four classes of naval units :

"1. *Capital ships. That is to say ships of more than 10,000 tons or armed with guns of more than eight-inch calibre.*

"2. *Airplane carriers of more than 10,000 tons.*

"3. *Surface ships of 10,000 tons or less, armed with guns of a calibre higher than six inches and up to eight inches.*

"4. *Deep-water submarines. That is to say of more than 6,000 tons.*

[1] The strenuous efforts made by the French Government to apprehend and interrogate Mr. Horam, the Paris correspondent of the Hearst press, who obtained the text of this document, goes far to prove its genuineness and the frankness of its language.

" The Treaty of Washington regulated the limitation in classes 1 and 2, and the disarmament conference will only have to examine the method of extending this limitation to the non-signatory Powers of this Treaty.

" With regard to classes 3 and 4, the final disarmament conference will fix the maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers, which no Power will be authorised to exceed for the total number of ships in each respective category during the period covered by the Convention. Within this maximum limit each Power will indicate to the final conference, for each of these categories, the tonnage she proposes to reach and which she proposes not to exceed during the period of time covered by the Convention.

" As long as our maritime interests for defence purposes were properly guarded, the principal task of the Government of the Republic has been to bring about in the course of negotiations with England the possibility of adherence of other navies to the solution in view, and above all that of the United States, whose aspirations, you were informed by my communication of September 4, 1927, clashed with the vital interests of the British Empire, since the unfruitful naval conference between England, America and Japan last year.

" The exclusion of small cruisers from all limitation seemed to us to be the only solution of the problem in hand between England and the United States, raised by the insistence of the British Admiralty in placing cruisers in two categories. As you know, in fact, at the tripartite naval conference, while agreement between England and America was nearly reached so far as concerned special limitation of larger cruisers, by the same token, the demands of England in so far as concerned the characteristics of the total tonnage of smaller cruisers, provoked a rupture of Anglo-American technical

conversations and the definite break up of the conference.

" The principal reason was that the maximum calibre of six inches demanded by the British Admiralty for the armament of smaller cruisers was also the calibre authorised in the Washington Treaty for commercial ships transformed into auxiliary cruisers.

" It would follow then that, even though the United States did possess the same number of smaller cruisers as England, the strength of the British Fleet as to the number of ship of this type could be considerably increased as soon as hostilities opened, due to the considerable number of auxiliary cruisers Great Britain possesses in her commercial fleet and which the United States does not.

" But in conversation with M. Paul Boncour during the session of the League of Nations last June, Sir Austen Chamberlain clearly stated the impossibility for his Government to accept any system whatsoever of naval limitation which did not at the same time carry special limitation of larger cruisers.

" In view of this and in view of the successive technical concessions which the Admiralty had made since the Naval Conference, it was clear that they attached capital interest only to this particular point. It was for that reason that, in order to reduce the number of categories they demanded, in the first place, the proposition made by Sir Austen Chamberlain in March, which maintained a category of large cruisers but at the same time did not even distinguish smaller cruisers from torpedo-boats.

" We were thus led to consider that the only method of removing the difficulty was to accord to the Admiralty a special limitation of larger cruisers, but to exclude any limitation for smaller cruisers.

" Doubtless this leaves the door open for a naval armaments race, but the moment one distinguishes between the two types of cruisers one must recognise the impossibility of equitable limitation of the smaller type if one does not take into account, as the United States desires, the auxiliary cruisers.

" Commercial ships, no matter what their military value, are no more limitable in our opinion, as well as in that of the Preparatory Commission and especially of the American delegation, than are all the elements which enter into what is called ' war strength.'

" The exclusion of all limitation of submarines for coastal defence solved at the same time the problem which the insistence of the British Admiralty raised in obtaining strict limitation of submarines of great radius of action.

" Under this guise the new solution would satisfy not only our navy, but also the navy of Japan, whose representative had demanded with insistence this exclusion during the Preparatory Naval Conference.

" This exclusion necessarily forced us to abandon the traditional French policy of limitation of naval units by the figure of global tonnage comprising all warships of whatever type, each power remaining more or less free to divide this tonnage between types most appropriate for the special needs of its defence at sea.

" In order to permit agreement between the great naval Powers, France finally aligned herself with the thesis of limitation by categories, but it is necessary to remark that the liberty of construction which our navy sought in limitation by global tonnage was found in the exclusion of all limitation of units of a character so defensive as small cruisers and submarines for coast defence.

" In this way the interests of maritime defence of

small naval countries was entirely protected, especially those who have no programme of distinctive construction, and who were counted, since the beginning of the preparatory work for disarmament, among the most devoted partisans of our naval thesis. Moreover, Italy could logically find therein her compensation for abandonment of the thesis of global tonnage, which she has always maintained almost integrally, although without allying herself to the transactional propositions made by M. Paul Boncour to the great naval Powers in March, 1927, and which are related in my communication of September 4 last year.

" Finally, the new Franco-British formula of naval limitation justifies the distinction that the French Navy, ever since the beginning of preparatory work for disarmament, has continued to make between the extent of limitation which should correspond theoretically, for each navy, with the guarantee of security of national interests, and figures which in practice would not exceed the naval programme of construction or replacement."

The United States Government gave the following reply to France and Great Britain who had submitted their compromise in identical terms :

" The Government of the United States has received from His Majesty's Government a communication summarising the understanding reached between the British and the French Governments as to a basis of naval limitation, which agreement, it is stated, will be submitted to the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

" The Government of the United States is willing to submit certain suggestions as to the basis of naval limitation as summarised in the British Note. From the communication of His Majesty's Government it appears

that the limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine will deal with four classes of men-of-war :

" 1. *Capital ships—that is, ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of more than eight-inch calibre.*

" 2. *Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.*

" 3. *Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre.*

" 4. *Ocean-going submarines of over 600 tons.*

" As the Washington Treaty regulates the first two classes—that is, capital ships and aircraft carriers, the Preparatory Commission will have to consider only the last two categories so far as the signatories of that Treaty are concerned.

" From the foregoing summary of the agreement it appears that the only classes of naval ships which it is proposed to limit under the Anglo-French Draft Agreement are cruisers of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more that six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre, and submarines of over 600 tons.

" The position of the Government of the United States had been, and now is, that any limitation of naval armaments to be effective should apply to all classes of combatant vessels.

" The Anglo-French Agreement provides no limitation whatsoever on six-inch gun cruisers or destroyers or submarines of 600 tons or less.

" It could not be claimed that the types of vessels thus left without limitation are not highly efficient fighting ships.

" No one would deny that modern cruisers armed with six-inch guns, or destroyers similarly armed, have a very

high offensive value, especially to any nation possessing well-distributed bases in various parts of the world. In fact, such cruisers constitute the largest number of fighting ships now existing in the world. The limitation of only such surface vessels as are restricted in class 3 of the Draft Agreement—that is, cruisers of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre—would be the imposition of restrictions only on types peculiarly suited to the needs of the United States.

"The United States cannot accept as a distinct class surface combatant vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre. It is, further, clearly apparent that limitation of this type only would add enormously to the comparative offensive power of a nation possessing a large merchant tonnage on which preparation may be made in times of peace for mounting six-inch guns.

"At the Three-Power Conference at Geneva in 1927 the British delegation proposed that cruisers be thus divided into two classes : those carrying eight-inch guns and those carrying guns of six inches or less in calibre.

"They proposed, further, that eight-inch guns and eight-inch gun cruisers be limited to a small number or to a small total tonnage elimination, and that the smaller class of cruisers carrying six-inch guns or less be permitted a much larger total tonnage, or, what amounts to the same thing, to a very large number of cruisers of this class.

"The limitation proposed by the British delegation on this smaller class of cruisers was so high that the American delegation considered it in effect no limitation at all.

"This same proposal is now presented in a new and even more objectionable form, which still limits large cruisers, which are suitable to American needs, but

frankly places no limitation whatever on cruisers carrying guns of six inches or less in calibre. This proposal is obviously incompatible with the American position at the Three-Power Conference. It is even more unacceptable than the proposal put forward by the British delegation at that conference, not only because it puts the United States at a decided disadvantage, but also because it discards altogether the principle of limitation as applied to important combatant types of vessels.

"Much of what has been said above as to vessels in class 3 of the Anglo-French Agreement applies with equal or greater force to class 4. The American Government cannot accept as a distinct class of submarines those of over 600 tons, leaving unlimited all submarines of 600 tons or under. Six-hundred-ton submarines are formidable combatant vessels. They carry the same torpedoes as are carried by larger submarines and of equal destructive force within the radius of their operation. They can also be armed with guns of five-inch calibre. The United States would gladly, in conjunction with all the nations of the world, abolish the submarine altogether. If, however, submarines must be continued as instruments of naval warfare, it is the belief of the American Government that they should be limited to a reasonable tonnage or number.

"If there is to be further limitation upon the construction of war vessels, so that competition in this regard between nations may be stopped, it is the belief of the United States that it should include all classes of combatant vessels, submarines as well as surface vessels.

"The Government of the United States has earnestly and consistently advocated real reduction and limitation of naval armament. It has given its best efforts towards finding acceptable methods of attaining this most desirable end.

"It would be happy to continue such efforts, but it cannot consent to proposals which would leave the door wide open to unlimited building of certain types of ships of a highly efficient combatant value, and would impose restrictions only on types peculiarly suitable to American needs.

"The American Government seeks no special advantage on the sea, but clearly cannot permit itself to be placed in a position of manifest disadvantage. The American Government feels, furthermore, that the terms of the Anglo-French Draft Agreement, in leaving unlimited so large a tonnage and so many types of vessels, would actually tend to defeat the primary objective of any disarmament conference for the reduction or the limitation of armament, in that it would not eliminate competition in naval armament and would not effect economy. For all these reasons the Government of the United States feels that no useful purpose would be served by accepting as a basis of discussion the Anglo-French proposal.

"The American Government has no objection to any agreement between Great Britain and France which those countries think will be to their advantage and in the interest of limitation of armament, but naturally cannot consent that such an agreement should be applied to the United States.

"In order to make quite clear that, in declining to adopt the Anglo-French agreement as a basis for discussion of naval limitation, it seems appropriate briefly to review the attitude of the United States regarding the methods of limitation in order to show that the American Government has consistently favoured a drastic proportional limitation. The success of the Washington Conference is known to all. It strictly limited all combatant ships and aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.

"In order to bring about such limitation the American Government made great sacrifices in the curtailment of plans of building and in the actual destruction of ships already built. At the first session of the Preparatory Conference the American Government submitted proposals which were consistently adhered to at subsequent meetings :

"1. That the total tonnage allowed in each class of combatant vessel be prescribed.

"2. That the maximum tonnage of a unit and the maximum calibre of gun allowed for each class be prescribed.

"3. That so long as the total tonnage allowed to each class is not exceeded, the actual number of units may be left to the discretion of each Power concerned.

"Within this general plan the American proposal at the Geneva Conference was, for the United States and the British Empire a total tonnage limitation in the cruiser class of from 250,000 to 300,000 tons, and for Japan from 150,000 to 180,000 tons.

"For the destroyer class, for the United States and the British Empire from 200,000 to 250,000, and for Japan from 120,000 to 150,000 tons.

"For the submarine class, for the United States and the British Empire 60,000 to 90,000 tons, and for Japan 36,000 to 54,000 tons.

"It was further stated by the American delegation that if any Power represented felt justified in proposing still lower tonnage levels for auxiliary craft the American Government would welcome such proposal.

"The purpose of these proposals was that there might be no competition between the three Powers in the

building of naval armament, that their respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security, and should not be of the size and character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent, and, finally, that a wise economy dictates that further naval construction be kept to a minimum.

"The Government of the United States remains willing to use its best efforts to obtain a basis of further naval limitation satisfactory to all the naval Powers, including those not represented at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva, and is willing to take into consideration in any conference the special needs of France, Italy, or any other naval Power for the particular class of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defence.

"This could be accomplished by permitting any of the Powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes within the total tonnage, a certain percentage to be agreed upon. If there was an increase in one class of vessels it should be deducted from the tonnage to be used in other classes. A proposal along these lines made by Great Britain, and discussed by the American and British representatives, would be sympathetically considered by the United States. It expects on the part of others, however, similar consideration for its own needs.

"Unfortunately, the Anglo-French Agreement appears to fulfil none of the conditions which to the American Government seem vital. It leaves unlimited a very large class of effective fighting ships, and this very fact would inevitably lead to a recrudescence of naval competition disastrous to national economy."